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ABSTRACT

With the increasing amount of digital storage of personal and organizational data, there
has been an increasing number of cyber-attacks, which has spurred much research on how to
reduce phishing susceptibility. However, there are several gaps in the current research. There is
little research on the effectiveness of different interventions on phishing susceptibility. There is
no research on the differential impact of interventions on sensitivity (ability to detect phishing
emails) and response bias (propensity to treat emails as threatening) or the influence of
individual characteristics on phishing email training success. This study addresses these gaps
using a quasi-experimental approach to evaluate a cyber-awareness training using Signal
Detection Theory (SDT) to measure phishing susceptibility on an organizational sample at the
Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT). Informational approaches to training were
effective in reducing phishing email susceptibility, however fear-appeals were not effective.
Sensitivity and response bias were differentially impacted by the informational approach to
cyber-awareness training. Cognitive ability predicted starting phishing email susceptibility and
affective and utility reactions predicted training success. Implications and directions for future
research are discussed.

v

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
As society becomes ever more reliant on technology, it is increasingly important that
employees throughout all industries are aware of cyber-security issues. Employees have access
to organizational systems and are vulnerable to cyber-attacks that can ultimately cause theft,
damage, or disruption to an organizational system’s hardware, software, information, or services.
An organization’s employees have the greatest potential to defend the organization from cyberattacks. While technological defenses and the teams of cyber-security professionals who
implement and manage the systems are necessary to an organization’s continued security, those
precautions are not sufficient. With ever-evolving threats and the ability for insiders to open up
system vulnerabilities (either intentionally or unintentionally), technological defenses cannot
completely secure an organization’s systems.
Psychological research can provide insights for leveraging the human capabilities needed
to improve cyber-security defenses. Social engineering used in phishing scams involves
exploiting end-users’ trust in order to gain access to a system. An understanding of human
cognition and the different influences on human behavior can improve both the evaluation of
training programs and the overall effectiveness of the intervention. The evaluation of phishing
training programs can be improved with more precise measurement of end-users’ phishing
susceptibility through the application of a cognitive model for decision-making, signal detection
theory (SDT; Green & Swets, 1966). Training effectiveness can be improved through the use of
psychological interventions designed to improve end-users’ affective, behavioral, and cognitive
learning outcomes (Kraiger, Ford, & Salas, 1993).
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The current study aims to utilize psychological research to reduce individuals’ phishing
susceptibility. First, I outline the quasi-experimental study used to evaluate the effectiveness of
different interventions on phishing susceptibility. Firstly, I provide background on the human
element of cyber-security including susceptibility to social engineering attacks, such as phishing.
Secondly, I review the literature on the measurement of phishing susceptibility. Thirdly, I present
a summary of the current state of phishing email training as well as the literature on the
components of effective employee training. Next, the hypotheses for this work are presented,
followed by the method, including details about the Texas Department of Transportation
(TxDOT) sample and the quasi-experimental study design. Then, the analyses that were used
following data collection are presented. Finally, a discussion section covering the practical and
theoretical implications of this work and the limitations and future directions is presented.
The Human Element in Cyber-security
Cyber-security professionals often cite humans as the “weakest link” in an organization’s
cyber-security chain (e.g., Arce, 2003; Lineberry, 2007; Nohlberg, 2009; Sasse, Brostoff, &
Weirich, 2001). Bruce Schneier, an internationally renowned security technologist, wrote on the
field of cyber-security;
“...the mathematics are impeccable, computers are vincible, the networks are lousy and
the people are abysmal. I’ve learned a lot about the problems of securing computers and
networks, but none that really helps solve the people problem” (Schneier, 2000).
Since adversaries typically use social engineering tactics to exploit users’ trust and gain access to
systems, it is easy to understand why cyber-security is a “people problem” rather than merely a
technological problem.
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A popular phishing training company cofounded by Kevin Mitnick (a famous hacker),
called KnowBe4, reported that in a sample of over 6 million end-users and across more than
11,000 organizations, the average phish prone percentage (calculated based on end-user behavior
during a simulated phishing attack) was 27% (Sjouwerman, 2018). With the average cost of a
successful phishing attack to a mid-sized company being $1.6 million (PhishMe, Inc., 2017),
having more than one in four employees vulnerable to phishing attacks poses a substantial threat
to organizations.
Employee vulnerability statistics are especially alarming given the common security
mantra, “it’s not if you’ll be attacked, but when.” According to Wombat Security’s State of the
Phish report (Wombat Security Technologies, 2018), which surveys over 10,000 information
security professionals, 76% of organizations surveyed said they experienced phishing attacks in
2017. Moreover, on average, 53% of information security professionals reported experiencing
spear-phishing, a more targeted form of phishing.
How does phishing work? Social engineers send emails pretending to be someone (e.g.,
an IT person from your organization) or something (e.g., Gmail) they are not, in order to extract
sensitive information out of their target. Their approach is to gain trust from the end-user in order
to retrieve the targeted information. Some tactics include attempts to elicit fear, curiosity, or a
sense of urgency out of the end-user to bypass or expedite a target’s typical decision-making
process for determining the legitimacy of emails. Recent surveys suggest the success rate of
different tactics has changed in recent years. Specifically, PhishMe reported that the emotional
motivators commonly used in phishing emails that previously held the highest end-user response
average (i.e., fear, urgency, and curiosity) were outpaced by entertainment, social, and reward
motivators (PhishMe, Inc., 2017).
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These tactics to elicit the end-user’s trust are applied through certain email design
features. Staggs and colleagues (2014) proposed a perceptual taxonomy with three types of
design features that influence an end-user’s cyber trust:1) content, 2) context, and 3) contract
(see Figure 1). The content features are specific to emails and include: 1) graphics, 2) URL
links, 3) attachments, and 4) signatures. Email graphics can foster suspicion when logos are
altered or of poor quality. Alternatively, phishing emails that include logos that are of high
quality and appear legitimate can increase a user’s trust in the email. URL (Universal Resource
Locators) links included in phishing emails can be obfuscated through the use of tiny URLs,
which can make the link appear more legitimate to end-users. URL misdirection is a common
tactic for leading users to compromised web pages. For instance, a phishing email may contain a
link that appears to be the Facebook login page, when in reality, it takes the user to a phony site
that collects the user’s information. Social engineers use this approach since URLs that end in a
risky domain name may decrease a users’ trust in the email. Moreover, URLs that link to
immediately download a file or start an executable are also cause for suspicion. Email
attachments represent a hazardous cue when the logo or file extension is identified as risky. For
instance, file attachment logos or extensions that show an executable file (.exe) indicate it is
risky to download the attachment. As with the graphics, when visual trickery is used to deceive
users into thinking the file is familiar or safe, it can increase a user’s trust in the email. Finally,
the email signature is another design feature that concerns the content of the email. The absence
of an email signature may cause suspicion of the email. Further, the presence of an email
signature that is unfamiliar or inconsistent with what the user expects can signal the user to
suspect malicious intent.
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The context features identified for emails are: 1) origin, 2) tone, and 3) language (Staggs
et al., 2014). Origin refers to the sender of the email. Like the URL links in content, the sender
address can alert the end-user to malicious intent when the address ends in a risky domain name.
Tone refers to the way the email is written to address the recipient. For instance, if the greeting
were formal, the email would convey a more professional tone. If the greeting was informal, but
the sender is unknown, this could cause the end-user to be suspicious of the email. Likewise, a
professional tone when it appears to be coming from a familiar address may be suspicious.
Another aspect of tone is the sense of urgency conveyed in the message. Often, in phishing
emails, social engineers design the email to create a sense of urgency to influence the recipient to
reveal sensitive information. For instance, phishing emails that appear to be from IT often claim
that the end-user’s password will expire in a number of days if action is not taken. Language
represents another part of the context that can cause suspicion in email communication. When an
email is riddled with spelling or grammar errors, it could indicate to an end-user that the email is
suspicious. Thus, the context with which the email was sent is an important determinant for the
end-user’s trust propensity.
The third and final type of features that influence end-user’s trust in an email are the
contract features, which include: 1) offer, 2) consideration, and 3) action. Offer focuses on what
the sender is claiming to provide the recipient in exchange for information. Phishing emails often
promise large sums of money and/or access to sensitive information. These offers can also alert
the end-user to malicious intent. Consideration involves the persuasion used to request
information from the end-user. For instance, oftentimes phishing emails will request information,
such as login credentials. Action involves urging the recipient to take some action that will allow
the social engineer access to their system. For instance, phishing emails often include urges to
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verify credentials, click URLs, or download attachments. Figure 2 displays an example phishing
email with several of the reviewed phishing design features included.
Many cyber awareness training programs incorporate informational curriculum on the
design features of phishing emails in order to educate employees on how to recognize phishing
emails. For instance, the Texas Department of Transportation’s (TxDOT) cyber awareness
training provides information on how to hover over URLs and identify suspicious links (content:
URL links), to check that the signature appears normal (content: signature), to recognize generic
salutations (context: origin), to be wary of the use of urgent tone (context: tone), to watch for odd
phrasing, bad grammar, or incorrect spelling (context: language), to be wary of emails requiring
immediate action (contract: action), and to recognize emails that contain unusual requests
(contract: consideration). Thus, the only design features from Staggs et al.’s (2014) taxonomy
that are not explicitly covered in the TxDOT training are the content features of suspicious
graphics and attachments. Figure 3 provides an example slide from the TxDOT training where
the above design features are covered.
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Figure 1. Staggs et al.’s (2014) cyber-trust taxonomy adapted to include only email design features (excludes web or social network
specific design features).
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Figure 2. Phishing email with several phishing design features, including; suspicious URL link, origin, tone, language, consideration,
offer, and action.
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Figure 3. TxDOT Phishing Email Training Slide Covering Email Design Features.
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This section provided an overview of the human element in cyber-security and details on
how phishing emails are used to exploit end-user trust and gain access to organizational systems.
Phishing emails are an effective method for opening vulnerabilities in an organization’s systems
via social engineering of the organization’s employees because phishing is easy and profitable
for attackers. Phishing emails are easy and inexpensive to create with virtually no cost to the
attacker and as long as one recipient falls for the phishing scam, it provides the attacker with the
ability to target the recipient, other employees and/or the organization as a whole. While the
design features of phishing emails and the nature of the targeting will likely continue to evolve as
attackers become smarter and technology allows for the faster and more effective gathering of
target background information and personalization of email content, the basic approach will
likely remain the same due to the underlying psychological manipulation.
Social engineering has been used as a tactic to gain target’s trust long before technology
changed the way we store and safe-guard information. For centuries, Con Artists utilized the
same psychological manipulations to gain targets’ trust and persuade them to divulge
confidential information. The term, “confidence man” (colloquially shortened to con man), dates
back to the early 1800s and is used today with great frequency. It follows that the best defense to
the psychological tactics used in social engineering involves employing psychological principles
to arm the most important link in an organization’s cyber-security defense—the humans. The
following section will review how the human element of an organization’s cyber-security
defense is measured in terms of phishing susceptibility.
The Quantification of Phishing Susceptibility
Organizations recognize the importance of a baseline assessment of employee phishing
susceptibility. Wombat Security’s State of the Phish report states that in 2017, 76% of
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organizations surveyed reported they measure their organization’s susceptibility to phishing.
However, there is no standard assessment for measuring phishing susceptibility. There have been
several different measures of phishing susceptibility used both in research and in practice. This
section will review different ways to quantify phishing susceptibility.
Self-Report. There have been several self-report scales used to measure phishing
susceptibility (e.g., Chuchuen & Chanvarasuth, 2015; Harrison, Vishwanath, & Rao, 2016;
James, Boyle, & Bennett, 2014; Sudzina & Pavlicek, 2017). James and colleagues (2014) used
the susceptibility to scams scale, a five-item self-report measure where participants rated their
agreement to five statements indicating their willingness to trust others and their wariness of
scams. Sudzina and Pavlicek (2017) simply measured propensity to click on suspicious links
with one question, "Would you click on suspiciously advantageous offer if it led to a deal site?"
and Likert scale response options for indicating the likelihood. In another study, researchers
looked at a self-reported measure of email trust where respondents were presented with a
phishing email and asked on a Likert scale with a single item to rate the extent to which they
agreed that they trusted the email (Harrison et al., 2016). Self-report measures of behavioral
tendency similar to those described above are limited in that they do not capture a person’s
ability to detect phishing emails.
Other measures of phishing susceptibility focus on self-reported behavioral intention for
given scenarios. For instance, several researchers have created scenarios or simulated email tasks
where participants indicate how they would respond to the email in the given scenario (e.g.,
Albladi & George, 2017; Curtis, Rajivan, Jones, & Gonzalez, 2018; Lawson, Zielinska, Pearson,
& Mayhorn, 2017; Martin, Dubé, & Coovert, 2018; McBride, Carter, & Warkentin, 2012;
Pattinson, Jerram, Parsons, McCormac, & Butavicius, 2011). Typically, participants were given
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a scenario description and several emails to read through and respond to. They were given a
variety of safe and unsafe behavioral response options for each simulated email scenario, such
as: reply to email, forward the email, click the link in the email, leave the email in the inbox and
flag for follow up, leave the email in the inbox, delete the email, or delete the email and block
the sender.
Simulated Attacks. Other researchers use actual simulated phishing attacks by sending
participants phishing emails to their personal or work email account and recording how many
participants open the email, click on the link, and/or provide the information requested in the
email (e.g., El-Din, Cairns, & Clark, 2014; Halevi, Lewis, & Memon, 2013; Halevi, Memon, &
Nov, 2015). This method involves deception, in that the participants are unaware that the email is
related to the study (i.e., the email is sent outside the formal context of the study/experiment).
Data obtained in this fashion are likely a more valid reflection of real-life phishing scenarios.
Still, there are obvious ethical considerations with the use of this methodology for collecting data
on phishing susceptibility and great care should be used when this is used in practice and
research settings. Many organizations have their IT departments “self-phish” their employees in
order to get a metric for phishing susceptibility. This is the method that KnowBe4 used on the
over 11,000 organizations included in their study evaluating the effectiveness of their phishing
email training on phishing susceptibility (Sjouwerman, 2018). Some companies even use these
methods to publicly reward or reprimand employees based on who reports or falls for the fake
phishing attacks (Sjouwerman, 2018). Though some argue these mock phishing attacks offer a
safe way to expose vulnerabilities (Beyer & Brummel, 2015), there is no research on the effects
self-phishing has on end-users’ trust of the IT department, self-efficacy, or other important
variables that are likely affected by continuous self-phishing.
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There are several ways to quantify the information from the behavioral responses based
on scenarios or simulated phishing attacks into a measure of a person’s phishing susceptibility.
Some researchers have used false positives (the percentage of genuine emails flagged as
phishing) and false negatives (the percentage of phishing emails treated as genuine emails) as
measures of phishing susceptibility (e.g., Pendleton, Garcia-Lebron, Cho, & Xu, 2016; Sheng,
Holbrook, Kumaraguru, Cranor, & Downs, 2010). Most researchers simply calculate end-users’
accuracy in responding to threatening emails (e.g., percentage of correct responses to phishing
emails). The typical accuracy measures are limited in that they ignore the fact that behavior
related to phishing emails occurs as part of a cognitive process that is influenced by expectancy
factors.
Signal Detection Theory. Recently, several studies have applied the statistical
framework provided by Signal Detection Theory (SDT)(Green & Swets, 1966) to measure
phishing susceptibility (Canfield et al., 2017; Canfield, Fischhoff, & Davis, 2016; Canfield &
Fischhoff, 2018; Martin et al., 2018; Mayhorn & Nyeste, 2012; Nguyen, 2018, 2018; Sheng et
al., 2007). SDT allows for the separation of sensitivity and bias as factors explaining behavior
(Green & Swets, 1966; Lynn & Barrett, 2014; Macmillan & Creelman, 2004). Sensitivity
represents a person’s ability to detect phishing emails or their ability to distinguish between
phishing emails and legitimate emails. Response bias is the propensity to be liberal or
conservative with regard to treating emails as threatening (responding safely versus unsafely). It
is important to separate sensitivity and response bias in phishing susceptibility because the two
are independent. Sensitivity is influenced by how easily a stimulus can be detected from noise
whereas response bias is influenced by expectations of the likelihood and/or costs of different
outcomes.
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Through the SDT model, if you present a person with a signal (e.g., phishing emails) and
noise (e.g., non-threatening or legitimate emails) and collect the person’s responses based on the
stimulus presented (e.g., click on link in email, forward to IT), the framework can be used to
compute a person’s sensitivity to the stimuli (i.e., ability to detect phishing emails) and their
response bias (i.e., propensity to treat emails as if they are threatening). Based on whether the
responses indicated that the individual perceived a stimulus or noise and whether or not a
stimulus was present, responses are categorized into one of four different outcomes: respond as if
the signal is present when it is present (hit); respond as if the signal is present when it is absent
(false alarm); respond as if the signal is absent when it is absent (correct rejection); and respond
as if the signal is absent when it is present (miss) (see Table 1). Over several trials with either the
stimulus present or absent, responses are collected and the hit rate (HR; the probability of
detecting a stimulus when it is present) and false alarm rate (FAR; the probability of detecting a
stimulus when it is absent) are calculated as follows:
# &' ()*+

Eq. 1: !" = # &' ,()+()-. /01)2+ ,3/+/-*/4
Eq. 2: 56" =

# &' '12+/ 12130+
# &' 2/.)*)01*/ /01)2+ ,3/+/-*/4

Table 1. Signal Detection Theory Outcomes

Signal Present
(phishing email presented)
Signal Absent
(legitimate email presented)

Respond “Absent”
(e.g., reply to email)
Miss

Respond “Present”
(e.g., delete email)
Hit

Correct rejection

False Alarm

Sensitivity, or 7 8 (d-prime), can then be calculated as the difference between the inverse
normal cumulative distribution functions of the HR and FAR (Macmillan & Creelman, 2004). D-
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prime is the difference between the means of the signal and noise distributions (see Figure 4).
Thus, an individual who has a large sensitivity to the stimulus (e.g., someone who is very good at
identifying phishing emails) will have a larger divide between their signal and noise
distributions. That is, they can more easily discriminate between a signal and noise and therefore,
the signal and noise distributions have less overlap.
Eq. 3: 7 8 = 9(!") − 9(56")
A person’s response bias, or decision criterion, represents the cutoff point for the decision
to respond as if the signal is present or absent. If the signal strength is great enough to where it is
to the right of the criterion in Figure 4, the individual would respond as if the signal were
present. In the example in Figure 4, the noise and signal distributions overlap enough to where
sometimes the individual would be correct to respond as if the signal were present (hit), but other
times, they would be responding to noise (false alarm). Still, as the signal strength increases, it is
more likely that responding as if a signal is present will result in a hit. In the measurement of
phishing susceptibility, the decision criterion would represent the threat level at which an
individual would respond as if the email were a phishing email. For instance, the typical
Nigerian Prince email (like the one in Figure 2) has enough phishing design features that the
signal strength, or threat level, is great enough to exceed the individual’s decision criterion and
they would respond as if the email were threatening (e.g., delete the email, notify IT, etc.).
Eq. 4: = = .5[9(!") + 9(56")]
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Figure 4. Signal Detection Theory Model.
When a person’s criterion shifts from the neutral position, it indicates either a liberal
response bias (to the left of the neutral position) or a conservative response bias (to the right of
the neutral position). A liberal response bias indicates that the person has a greater propensity to
respond as if a signal is present. Thus, response bias is measured as the distance between the
criterion and the point at which the signal and noise distributions intersect. In the context of
phishing emails, this would reflect a person who is more likely to respond with safe behaviors
(forward an email to IT, delete the email, etc.). On the other hand, a conservative response bias
indicates a greater propensity to respond as if there is no stimulus. That is, the individual would
be more likely to respond with unsafe behaviors (e.g., reply to the sender, download the
attachment, click on the link in the email, etc.).
Two variables are known to influence response bias: 1) payoff perceptions, which are an
individual’s perceptions of the costs and benefits associated with each of four possible decision
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outcomes (correct detections, missed detections, false alarms, and correction rejections) and 2)
base-rate, which is the probability of targets relative to noise (Green & Swets, 1966; Lynn &
Barrett, 2014; Macmillan & Creelman, 2004).
Payoff perceptions influence employees’ cyber-security compliance in that an
individual’s perception that misses (e.g., the threat of cyber-attack) are costly promotes a smaller
response bias for judging that a target is present. This bias would make employees more likely to
treat emails as if they are threatening or they need to be more alert/vigilant when responding to
emails. An extreme example would be a paranoid employee who scrutinizes each email for any
indication of a threat. Alternatively, the weightless, abstract nature of data loss through security
breaches or excessive trust in their organization’s IT security may lead employees to
underestimate the cost of misses, resulting in a conservative bias, where employees would be less
likely to treat emails as threatening. Similarly, the perception that false alarms (e.g., hindering
productivity by spending too much time evaluating and verifying emails) are costly promotes a
more conservative response bias.
Typically, due to the volume of legitimate emails and the recent use of automatic
screening software, the prevalence rate of phishing emails is very low (<1%) (Canfield et al.,
2016). A low base rate of the stimulus typically results in a conservative response bias because
people are more likely to identify a stimulus as noise when they know it is unlikely that a
stimulus will occur (Lynn & Barrett, 2014). Phishing email base rate cannot realistically be
manipulated by organizations unless they were to periodically phish their own employees or
allow more legitimate phishing emails past their automatic filters.
In order to optimize performance, organizations need to find a balance and make sure that
creating an awareness of the risks does not push employees too far, resulting in increased
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vigilance disrupting productivity. For most organizations, they would want employees to be at
“relaxed alert” (IBRS adaptation of the Cooper color codes) (Givens, 2004) where the user is
aware of their actions and their environment. Text, semantics, nuances of language, sender
information from an email that seems wrong will stand out, which can push a user into a higher
alert level. This level of readiness keeps employees alert (as opposed to unaware and
unprepared) but relaxed so they do not become exhausted from being extra vigilant. Depending
on which costs (e.g., employee productivity dollars, cyber-breach dollars) an organization
chooses to minimize, companies can calculate an optimal criterion (response bias level) for their
cyber-security goals.
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves are used to visualize sensitivity and
response bias. ROC curves plot the hit rate that would be obtained for every value of false alarm
rate, given a certain d′ value. When d′ is equal to zero, it indicates that performance is at chance
level, or the decision-maker has no ability to distinguish between the two signals (see the line
labeled “d′ = 0” in Figure 5). As the ability for the decision-maker to distinguish between signal
and noise increases, the curves shift toward the upper left corner, where accuracy is maximized,
or the hit rate is always greater than or equal to the false-alarm rate (labeled “d′ = 3” in Figure 5).
ROC points are typically calculated through having participants rate their confidence in their
decision for each stimulus (Wixted, 2007, p. 153). Response bias can be visually evaluated by
looking at where the ROC points fall along the curve. Points that are further toward the top right
corner of the ROC plot indicate a liberal bias where the respondent has both a high hit rate and
high false alarm rate, indicating they are more likely to respond as if the signal is present,
regardless of the stimulus (see blue points in Figure 5). On the other hand, points that are closer
to the bottom left corner of the ROC curve indicate a conservative response where there is both a
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low hit rate and low false alarm rate, indicating the respondent was more likely to respond as if
the signal was absent regardless of the stimulus (see red points in Figure 5 ROC curves are also
used to determine SDT model fit to the observed data. The closer the observed data points are to
the SDT generated curve, the better the SDT model fits the data. The fit can be empirically
evaluated using a chi-squared test of model fit (see the analysis section for more detail).

Figure 5. ROC Curve

Overall, SDT is useful for assessing an individual’s ability to detect phishing emails
(sensitivity) and their propensity to respond safely to emails (response bias). SDT statistics
provide a superior quantification of phishing susceptibility because they move beyond the simple
calculation of accuracy (e.g., percent correct) by evaluating an individual’s perceptual ability to
distinguish between threatening and non-threatening emails (sensitivity) and taking into account
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other objectives, such as responding to legitimate emails appropriately (i.e., correct rejections)
(Canfield et al., 2016). With the calculation of d-prime, “SDT accommodates the inevitable
trade-off between hit rates (H, correctly identifying a signal) and false-alarm rates (FA,
incorrectly identifying noise as signals)” (Canfield et al., 2016 p. 1159).
SDT metrics also allow for the incorporation of expectancy factors through the
calculation of response bias. Response bias is influenced by a person’s perceptions of the costs of
different outcomes and their perception of the base rate occurrence of the stimuli. By quantifying
performance, SDT offers metrics for analyzing individuals’ vulnerability as well as for designing
and evaluating interventions to reduce it, such as training and incentives. For instance, a large
tech company in Tampa, Florida rewards employees for detecting their IT’s phishing emails with
a notification congratulating them on finding the phishing email. Moreover, if they find a
legitimate phishing email, they are rewarded with $50. SDT could capture the effect these
incentives have on employees’ response bias.
This section summarized the different measures used for phishing susceptibility and the
many benefits and previous research associated with operationalizing phishing susceptibility
through SDT. The next section will review how training interventions can be used to reduce
phishing susceptibility.
The Current State of End-User Phishing Email Awareness Training
Many organizations recognize that all employees who use the organization’s networks
must be trained on the knowledge, skills, and policies related to cyber-security (Beyer &
Brummel, 2015). The State of the Phish report states that 95% of those surveyed report that their
organization trains end-users on how to identify and avoid phishing attacks (Wombat Security
Technologies, 2018). Still, only 54% of information security professionals surveyed reported that
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they have been able to quantify a reduction in phishing susceptibility based on their training
activities (Wombat Security Technologies, 2018).
There are several different types of training that have been studied as interventions to
reduce phishing susceptibility. Most training programs include educational elements aimed at
reducing phishing susceptibility through teaching end-users how to identify phishing emails and
how to respond to them. Additionally, several researchers have evaluated the effects of fearbased elements, which aim to increase end-user motivation to identify and respond safely to
phishing emails. Moreover, one study evaluated the effectiveness of incorporating elements of
mindfulness training to teach users to take the time to pause and critically evaluate emails before
responding (Nguyen, 2018).
Rule-Based Training
One type of training that organizations use to reduce phishing susceptibility includes
providing informational training ranging from simple lists of internet tips for users to
information on specific design cues to look out for (like with the TxDOT training previously
reviewed) to cartoons that help explain tips in a story format (Anti-Phishing Phil; Sheng et al.,
2007) to game-based phishing training that sends test emails to individuals, providing feedback
for correct and incorrect responses to phishing emails (PhishGuru; Kumaraguru et al., 2007).
These educational training programs can be referred to as rule-based training, where end-users
are instructed to apply sets of rules to received emails in order to identify and correctly respond
to the emails (Jansen, 2018; Nguyen, 2018). For instance, the TxDOT training instructs endusers to look out for emails with generic salutations (e.g., “Dear friend,”). If the end-user is
suspicious of the email, they are instructed to “Play IT Forward” by forwarding the email to IT to
find out if it is safe.
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Rule-based training has demonstrated effectiveness in reducing phishing susceptibility in
several studies (Alnajim & Munro, 2008, 2009; Kumaraguru et al., 2009, 2007; Kumaraguru,
Sheng, Acquisti, Cranor, & Hong, 2010; Mayhorn & Nyeste, 2012; Sheng et al., 2007). Alnajim
and Munro (2008, 2009) found certain tips regarding phishing websites (e.g., “Type in your
browser the address of the site you intend to go or use a bookmark that you previously created.”)
resulted in a small increase in the correct decision rate participants had with regard to submitting
their information to phishing websites. Kumaraguru and colleagues (2009) found that the
percentage of participants who clicked on phishing links and/or gave information was reduced by
almost 20% using the Anti-Phishing Phil training and that the knowledge from the training was
retained even after 28 days.
Fear Appeals
One successful avenue for training in security research appears to be through the use of
fear appeals. Research, including two recent meta-analyses (Sheeran, Harris, & Epton, 2014;
Tannenbaum et al., 2015), have shown that risk appraisals, which increase individuals’
awareness of potential threats and their sense of vulnerability to harm, have a large influence on
attitudes, intentions, and behaviors. Fear appeals are intended to arouse fear in their audience by
emphasizing the danger in not following the guidelines or recommendations laid out in the
message (Tannenbaum et al., 2015). The influence of fear appeals is grounded in protection
motivation theory (Maddux & Rogers, 1983), which stipulates that protection motivation, or the
intention to act cautiously, is initiated by the threat appraisal process where individuals evaluate
their perceived vulnerability and the severity of the consequences of the threat (Jansen & van
Schaik, 2018). Thus, fear appeals motivate individuals to change their attitudes, intentions,
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and/or behaviors in order to reduce their perceived vulnerability and the perceived threat of
harmful consequences.
This effect has been demonstrated in a variety of contexts, including many health-related
topics (Anand-Keller, 1999) such as reckless driving (Lewis, Watson, Tay, & White, 2007),
dental care (Evans, Rozelle, Lasater, Dembroski, & Allen, 1970), tanning (Cooper, Goldenberg,
& Arndt, 2014), and smoking (Thompson, Barnett, & Pearce, 2009). Research demonstrates that
fear appeals can also influence energy consumption (Hass, Bagley, & Rogers, 1975) and
advertising (Henthorne, LaTour, & Nataraajan, 1993). The use of fear appeals is also pervasive
in the area of information security, with studies surrounding the influence of fear appeals on
protective security behaviors such as creating stronger passwords, complying with IT
procedures, and protecting organizational information assets (Boss, Galletta, Lowry, Moody, &
Polak, 2015; Sasse et al., 2001; Vance, Eargle, Ouimet, & Straub, 2013; Wall & Buche, 2017). A
recent study used these principles to test the influence of a fear appeal intervention on
precautionary internet behavior (Jansen & van Schaik, 2018). These authors found that fear
appeals did predict protection motivation and intentions to perform precautionary behavior
(Jansen & van Schaik, 2018).
A couple of recent studies evaluated the influence of fear appeals on phishing email
susceptibility. One study found that risk level manipulations during cyber awareness training
predicted self-reported secure internet behavior a week after the training occurred (Davinson &
Sillence, 2010). Another study reported that increasing a participant’s general fear level through
three news articles after informational training predicted greater training success when compared
with a control condition (Zielinska et al., 2014).
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The limitation of the above research on the use of fear appeals to reduce phishing
susceptibility is that phishing susceptibility is narrowly measured in the studies. It is unexplored
whether the use of fear appeals in phishing email training changes cautionary behavior with
regard to emails (response bias) and/or phishing email detection performance (sensitivity). It
could be that the awareness of perceived vulnerability and threat level caused by fear appeals
maps onto the base rate and expectations of costs that have been shown to influence response
bias. However, since sensitivity is resistant to the influence of expectancy factors, perhaps fear
appeals have no effect on phishing email detection ability.
On the other hand, there is research that suggests that negative mood states, such as
anxiety or fear, promote detail-orientation on primary tasks (De Dreu, Baas, & Nijstad, 2008). In
this sense, one could argue that fear appeals, to the extent that they bolster fear and anxiety in
their audience, may increase performance arousal and therefore increase phishing email detection
performance. This relationship between arousal and performance is well researched, with the
general psychological principle of the Yerkes-Dodson effect, which stipulates that performance
increases with arousal, but only up to a certain arousal level, at which performance starts to
decline (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908). It is unlikely that written fear appeals would cause a high
enough arousal level to reach the point at which performance decreases, however it is important
to consider the possibility of a non-linear relationship between arousal and performance in the
context of phishing email detection.
The distinction between effects on response bias versus phishing email detection has
important implications, because an organization must consider the tradeoffs associated with
manipulating response bias, such that people respond more safely to all emails. On the positive
side, applying safe responses to all emails would invariably reduce phishing susceptibility.
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However, there are also certain costs to consider with the increase in false alarms (e.g., reduction
in employee productivity, overloading IT personnel with reports of phishing emails).
Overall, the available research on phishing email training is relatively new, sparse, and
published primarily in technical journals and conference proceedings (e.g., Alnajim & Munro,
2008, 2009; Kumaraguru et al., 2009, 2009, 2007; Sheng et al., 2010, 2007). Both the evaluation
and implementation of cyber-awareness training for end-users could be improved through the
application of training research from I-O psychology. The next section will review the science of
training found in the I-O psychology literature and applications to cyber-awareness training.
The Science of Training
I-O psychology has a long history of science-based training research dating back to the
early 1900s (Bell, Tannenbaum, Ford, Noe, & Kraiger, 2017). The research involved developing
and validating techniques for designing, conducting, and evaluating training programs. Salas,
Tannenbaum, Kraiger, and Smith-Jentsch (2012) summed up training research with the
following statement: “the research on training clearly shows two things: (a) training works, and
(b) the way training is designed, delivered, and implemented matters” (p. 74). There have been
several meta-analyses focused on employee training and development that provide effect sizes
that quantify the effectiveness of training and also show the conditions in which training is most
effective (e.g., Arthur, Bennett, Edens, & Bell, 2003; Blume, Ford, Baldwin, & Huang, 2010;
Colquitt, LePine, & Noe, 2000; Taylor, Russ-Eft, & Chan, 2005). Goldstein’s Instructional
Systems Design (ISD) model outlined the essential steps to creating an effective training
program; training needs assessment, training design, training delivery, and training evaluation
(Goldstein & Ford, 2002). This section will review research from the training literature on these
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four steps for creating a training program and how the science of training can be used to
implement phishing email training.
Training Needs Assessment
The training needs assessment (TNA) allows for the assessment of characteristics of the
job and the trainees and organizational goals and constraints. The purpose of TNA is to ensure
that training resources are spent on areas of a demonstrated need. TNA involves analyzing
training needs at three levels: the person, job and task, and organizational levels (McGehee &
Thayer, 1961). At the person level, the employees’ KSAOs are evaluated to determine the areas
with the greatest potential for training. At the job level, the nature of the tasks involved is
assessed through job analysis techniques. This assessment of the tasks involved can help to
inform the content of the training. At the organizational level, the company’s objectives and
goals are assessed to determine the indicators of organizational effectiveness and any potential
barriers to training success, such as organizational support and constraints. Ultimately, the TNA
informs the design and delivery of the training program by ensuring that training resources are
spent in areas of demonstrated need in terms of which employees need the training, which job
tasks need to be improved, and which organizational goals need to be met. Research shows that
despite the importance of TNA, only 6% of companies report having done a needs assessment
prior to implementing training (Arthur et al., 2003).
TNA is an important consideration for cyber-security awareness training. At the person
level, organization’s need to evaluate employees’ KSAOs related to cyber-security performance
in order to get an assessment of the potential for improvement through training. At the job level,
it is important to understand how the importance of cyber-security defense differs for different
positions. For instance, training on effective cyber-security behaviors may be especially
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important for Human Resources employees because their logins can be used to access all of the
organization’s employee data.
Moreover, it is important to understand where cyber-security fits into different
employees’ job roles. Often, employees are expected to comply with cyber-security policies even
though cyber-security is not part of their job description. The extra-role nature of cyber-security
performance can lead to motivational challenges with regard to training. At the job level, it is
also important to identify and evaluate the specific tasks or critical work functions for cybersecurity defense (e.g., forwarding suspicious emails to IT).
There are also TNA considerations at the organizational level. Companies have different
postures related to cyber-security policies (offensive, defensive, strong, intentionally weak, etc.).
Some companies choose not to defend themselves (minimal legal compliance) because they can
get insurance to cover the costs of breaches. Understanding an organization’s security posture is
important for ensuring that the training goals are aligned with the organizational goals regarding
security.
Training Design and Delivery
Training design involves the creation of the training content, while training delivery
involves the method and implementation of the training. The TNA provides the foundational
blueprint for the design and delivery of training (Salas et al., 2012). For instance, the job-level of
the TNA provides information on which tasks to include in the training content, while the
person-level of the TNA provides information on the best mode of delivery considering
individual characteristics. Specifically, training is shown to be more effective for older workers
when the training is self-paced (Kueider, Parisi, Gross, & Rebok, 2012). The organizational-level
of the TNA informs training design and delivery through the organizational resources available

27

for training development. For instance, there may not be organizational resources available to
coordinate and implement a two-week in-person training for all staff on cyber-security
awareness.
Effective training involves the key elements of instruction, demonstration, practice, and
feedback (Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001; Salas et al., 2012). An important consideration for the
practice element of training is there should be variability among contextual stimuli, practice
frequency, and practice method (Baldwin & Ford, 1988). Through effective training design and
delivery, trainees will learn targeted knowledge, skills, and attitudes (KSAs), which will result in
changes in cognition, behavior, and affect (Kraiger et al., 1993; Salas et al., 2012).
Effective training will set and communicate objectives for the training, including a
statement of what you should be able to do/think/feel after the training (Cascio & Aguinis,
2005). For instance, end-user cyber-security training should include an objective similar to, “Be
more vigilant with email by using simple and effective techniques to recognize phishing email
scams.” Research shows that when trainees understand the objectives, purpose, and intended
outcomes of training, learning and transfer outcomes are improved (Noe & Colquitt, 2002).
Further, training design increases training effectiveness when the content includes meaningful
examples and exercises that are relevant to the job (e.g., provides phishing emails that are
common and similar to what employee may receive), learning aids to help trainees retain
information (e.g., the TxDOT uses the saying “Don’t be quick to click” throughout their phishing
email training), a safe environment to practice (i.e., there is no penalty for mistakes in training),
and feedback for trainees on their learning (e.g., results to quiz responses that include feedback
on why responses are incorrect) (Noe & Colquitt, 2002; Salas et al., 2012).
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There are several different delivery methods used in training including: computer-assisted
instruction, realistic training environments (e.g., simulation), behavior modeling (see Taylor et
al., 2005 for a meta-analytic review of behavior modeling traning), serious gaming (see Wilson
et al., 2009), and error management (see Keith & Frese, 2008 for a meta-analyitic review of error
management training). Choice of an appropriate delivery method for training should be based on
the nature of the KSAs to be trained, individual characteristics of trainees, and business goals
and organizational resources for training.
Training Evaluation
The development of a new training program should always include training evaluation.
Since 1959, Kirkpatrick’s four levels of training (reaction, learning, behavior, and results) have
been widely used and accepted (Kirkpatrick, 1959a, 1959b, 1960a, 1960b, 1996). Trainee
reactions are generally measures of how the trainees feel about various aspects of the trainee
program (Kirkpatrick, 1996). Measurement of trainee reactions to the training should include
both perceptions of training utility (i.e., was the training useful?) and affective perceptions of the
training (i.e., did you like the training?) because utility reactions have been shown to predict
training transfer (Alliger, Tannenbaum, Bennett Jr, Traver, & Shotland, 1997). Training
reactions are also important because they provide an indirect indication of how motivated
trainees were to learn (Kirkpatrick, 1996). Specifically, if a trainee has negative reactions to the
training, it is unlikely that the trainee put a lot of effort into learning during the training.
Learning is a measure of the change in KSAs (Knowledge, Skills, and Attitudes)
(Kirkpatrick, 1996). That is, the learning evaluation indicated the knowledge acquired, skills
improved, and/or attitudes changed due to the training intervention. Typically, learning is
evaluated through pre- and posttests of knowledge, skills, and/or attitudes. Knowledge and
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attitudes are typically assessed through paper-and-pencil assessments, while skills are assessed
through a performance test. Research suggests that learning outcomes are multidimensional,
including three components: affective, skill-based (behavioral), and cognitive (Kraiger et al.,
1993). Behavior is a measure of the extent to which trainees change their on-the-job behavior as
a result of training (Kirkpatrick, 1996). Depending on the targeted KSAs of training, behavior
can be evaluated through employee performance reviews. For phishing email training, some
organizations evaluate on-the-job behavior though periodic phishing of their employees. Results
are an organizational indication of the effectiveness of training (e.g., high productivity, increased
profits). For cyber-security training, results could be captured in an organization-wide reduction
in successful phishing attacks.
In addition to training needs assessment, training design, training delivery, and training
evaluation, there are several other variables that influence training success as part of the larger
training context. The influence of training characteristics was previously mentioned in the review
of the person analysis as part of the TNA. The work environment in terms of organizational
support for training, opportunities to use training, and any work constraints also predict training
success (Baldwin & Ford, 1988).
The Larger Training Context: The Influence of Individual Differences
Baldwin and Ford (1988) created the most cited theoretical model of training transfer,
which outlines the different variables that influence training success in terms of generalization of
the KSAs trained to on-the-job performance. According to their model, training transfer is
affected by training inputs (trainee characteristics, training design, and work environment) and
training outputs (learning and retention). The trainee characteristics that have the greatest effect
on training transfer are learning goal orientation, cognitive ability, negative affect, openness,
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self-efficacy, perceived utility, organizational commitment, and pretraining motivation (Baldwin
& Ford, 1988). Similarly, trainee characteristics influence training outcomes, such as learning.
The importance of the assessment of individual differences for identifying trainee
characteristics that influence training success has been well established through research (see
Bell et al., 2017 for a review). Individual differences shown to affect training success include:
cognitive ability (Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998), personality traits
(Barrick & Mount, 1991), motivational constructs (Colquitt et al., 2000; Noe & Schmitt, 1986),
goal orientation (Martocchio & Hertenstein, 2003) and values and interests (Gordon & Alf,
1962). Blume, Ford, Baldwin and Huang (2010) conducted a meta-analysis on the transfer of
training and found that some of the greatest predictors of training transfer in terms of trainee
characteristics were cognitive ability (r = .37), conscientiousness (r = .28), neuroticism (r = -.19),
learning goal orientation (r = .16), pretraining self-efficacy (r = .22), and motivation (r = .29).
Cognitive ability, or general mental ability (g), is one of the most consistently strong
predictors of training success across job domains, with the commonly cited validity coefficient of
r=.56 from Schmidt and Hunter’s (1998) meta-analysis of predictors of job performance and
training performance. Ree and Earles (1991) found that general ability (g) was the greatest
predictor of training grades in a sample of Air Force enlistees.
Despite the research on the importance of cognitive ability for training and employee
performance across different jobs, there has been little research on the relationship of cognitive
ability to phishing email susceptibility to date. One study found that working memory (as
measured by the Alphabet span task) and selective attention (as measured by the Stroop task)
were significantly related to phishing susceptibility (measured as the miss rate or identifying
phishing emails as trustworthy) (Mayhorn & Nyeste, 2012). Further research is needed to
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understand the influence of cognitive ability on phishing susceptibility and on cyber awareness
training success.
This section reviewed the science of training, providing evidence-based suggestions for
cyber awareness training for end-users. The reviewed theoretical framework for training
evaluation and training context will be used to assess the influence of different interventions for
improving employee phishing susceptibility in this study. The following section outlines
hypotheses based on the review of the literature in the previous sections.
Hypotheses
The previous sections reviewed recent findings related to phishing susceptibility research
and the theoretical foundations of training research. In this section, I propose several hypotheses
based on previous research and theory to test as part of a phishing email training evaluation for a
sample of transportation workers. The proposed study has three primary goals.
The first goal is to evaluate the effectiveness of phishing email training with regard to
informational approaches and fear-appeals. To this aim all participants receive phishing email
training that is primarily informational in nature. Specifically, the training provides information
on the characteristics, or design features, found in phishing emails and how to recognize and
response to the threats. Employees will be assessed on phishing susceptibility (sensitivity and
bias) using behavioral responses during an email simulation containing several phishing emails
both before and after training. Employees will also be randomly assigned to fear appeal
conditions to supplement the standard training. One group will receive a strong fear appeal, one
will receive a weak fear appeal, and one will receive no fear appeal (control condition).
The second goal is to distinguish between sensitivity and response bias in phishing
susceptibility and evaluate the differential impact that training and fear appeals have on each of
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the two outcomes. Understanding the differential impact of training on response bias and
sensitivity has implications for how organizations should approach training. If training mostly
impacts response bias rather than sensitivity, organizations should consider the impact that a
greater tendency to treat emails as threatening could have on other aspects of organizational
performance (e.g., productivity).
The third goal is to understand the influence of the larger training context on training
success. To this aim, employees will answer questions pertaining to training reactions, cognitive
ability, and demographics, which will be evaluated for their effects on baseline phishing
susceptibility (pretest scores) and training success (changes in phishing sensitivity and response
bias between the pretest and posttest). Thus, the following hypotheses will be examined:
First, based on the distinction between sensitivity and response bias in phishing
susceptibility, I hypothesize that an employee’s sensitivity and bias will be differentially
influenced by phishing email training interventions. Response bias is thought to be variable and
influenced by environmental and expectancy factors (Lynn & Barrett, 2014). Thus, I hypothesize
that:
Hypothesis 1: There will be a significant, negative change in individuals’ response bias
after training, such that individuals will have a more liberal response bias after training.
Hypothesis 2: The change in response bias between pre- and posttest scores will depend
on the fear appeal intervention, such that the strong fear appeal will predict the largest
difference in pre- and posttest response bias, the weak fear appeal will predict a smaller
difference in response bias, and the control condition will have the smallest impact on
response bias.
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Alternatively, sensitivity to phishing emails is a perceptual ability that represents a relatively
stable individual difference that is unlikely to be influenced by expectancy factors, such as fear
appeals. Still, the information provided in training on how to recognize email design features will
likely result in some improvement in phishing email sensitivity.
Research Question 1: Are the effects of the training intervention different for the
sensitivity and response bias outcomes?
Hypothesis 3: There will be a significant change in individuals’ sensitivity to phishing
emails after training, such that individuals will have a greater sensitivity to phishing
email after training.
Hypothesis 4: The change in sensitivity between pre- and post-test scores will not
significantly differ across fear appeal conditions.
Recent research suggests that individual differences may explain an individual’s susceptibility to
targeting to phishing emails. Thus, I propose that there are stable individual differences, such as
cognitive ability, that will influence phishing email sensitivity.
Hypothesis 5: Cognitive ability will positively relate to individuals’ phishing sensitivity,
such that individuals with higher cognitive ability will have a greater sensitivity to
phishing emails pre-training.
Research Question 2: Does the success of training (change in sensitivity scores between
pre- and post-training assessments) depend on cognitive ability?
Based on the research on trainee reactions (Alliger et al., 1997; Kirkpatrick, 1996), I predict that
trainee reactions to training will influence training success.
Hypothesis 6a: Utility reactions will positively relate to change in phishing sensitivity,
such that individuals with higher perceptions of training utility will have a greater
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change in pretest and posttest phishing sensitivity than those with lower utility
perceptions.
Hypothesis 6b: Utility reactions will positively relate to change in response bias, such
that individuals with higher perceptions of training utility will have a greater change in
pretest and posttest response bias than those with lower utility perceptions.
Hypothesis 7a: Affective reactions will positively relate to change in phishing sensitivity,
such that individuals with higher affective perceptions of training will have a greater
change in pretest and posttest phishing sensitivity than those with lower affective
perceptions.
Hypothesis 7b: Affective reactions will positively relate to change in response bias, such
that individuals with higher affective perceptions of training will have a greater change
in pretest and posttest response bias than those with lower affective reactions.
This section detailed the study hypotheses and the accompanying research and theoretical
backgrounds. These hypotheses will be tested to address the three goals of the current research:
1) to evaluate the effectiveness of informational cyber awareness training and fear-appeals on
phishing susceptibility, 2) to distinguish between sensitivity (phishing email detection ability)
and response bias (tendency to response safely or unsafely to emails) in phishing susceptibility,
and 3) to understand the influence of the larger training context on phishing email training
success. The next chapter will detail the methodology used in this study.
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CHAPTER TWO: METHOD
Participants
Participants were recruited via their work email provided by the Workforce Development
Director of the TxDOT. There were 1,714 TxDOT employees who were identified as eligible for
the study as their annual cyber-security training was due during the data collection period. These
employees were emailed through Qualtrics using the Qualtrics mail merge software to assign IDs
to each recipient to be used to connect the surveys without the use of any identifiable information
(see Appendix A for the recruitment email). A reminder email was sent to all employees
identified to participate in the study by the Director of Workforce Development. Employees were
encouraged to use company time to complete the survey and responses were anonymous with no
penalty for choosing not to participate.
Participants in the present study were 248 TxDOT employees. This sample size was
determined as the appropriate recruitment number based on an a priori power analysis. A sample
size of 100 was derived from an a priori power analysis using G*power (Faul, Erdfelder,
Buchner, & Lang, 2009). This estimate was based on the regression analyses for reactions
predicting response bias and sensitivity. For the inputs for the power analysis, an alpha of .05,
and a power of .95, and an effect size of .10 was used for reactions predicting response bias and
sensitivity, which is similar to what prior research has found for reactions predicting behavioral
outcomes in training (see Alliger et al., 1997). Since, the majority of the analyses require the
completion of both the pre- and post-training surveys, recruitment continued until at least 100
participants completed both the pre- and post-training surveys. This recruitment strategy resulted
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in a sample of 248 respondents who completed the pre-training survey and 174 respondents who
completed the post-training survey. Duplicate (N=6) and partial (N=28) responses were removed
and responses were screened to remove those that did not take the training in-between the
surveys. These participants were identified as those who had a self-reported training completion
date prior to the start of data collection (N=26). The final sample of respondents that completed
both surveys and met the above inclusion criteria comprised of 139 participants (226 completed
at least one survey).
Participants were predominately male (62.3%), with a large proportion of participants
holding a bachelor’s degree (37.4%) as their highest level of education, and fewer with some
college courses (24.6%), a graduate degree (12.8%), associate’s degree (13.3%), a high school
diploma (11.3%), or less than a high school diploma (0.5%). The majority of the respondents had
been at TxDOT between 0 and 5 years (56.9%) and in their current position between 0 and 2
years (57.1%). Only one participant held a cyber certification (0.5%), 23 had cyber education
(11.1%), and eight had previously held a job where the primary responsibilities were cybersecurity (3.9%). Less than half of participants indicated that they had helped someone fix a
computer problem (40.6%). The majority of participants indicated they receive less than 50
emails per day to their work email (81.2%) and spend between 0 and 2 hours per day on email
(72.3%). The results of multiple one-way analysis of variances (ANOVAs) indicated there was
no significant difference between the randomly assigned fear condition groups on any of the
measured demographic variables.
Procedure
During a three-month period, TxDOT employees who were due to take the mandatory
annual cyber-security training within the next one to two months were emailed an invitation to
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participate in the study and a link to the pre-training assessment and post-training assessments,
hosted by Qualtrics. They were instructed that there were two survey links in the email and that
they should first take the pre-training assessment (first link), then complete their training as
normal, and finally come back to the email to complete the post-training assessment (second
link). The Director of Workforce Development also sent a follow-up email to the participants as
a reminder to participate if they had not already done so.
The pre-training assessment survey contained an informed consent, a phishing email
simulation, and demographics. The informed consent included information on the purpose of the
study, risks and benefits to participation, and the study procedures. The phishing email
simulation contained 30 emails, 10 of which were legitimate and five of which are phishing
emails. After completing the pre-training assessment, participants were instructed to complete
their security training through the portal provided by TxDOT. This training is a self-paced course
in a slide deck format with an optional audio narration.
After employees took the mandatory training, they were instructed to take the posttraining assessment by clicking on the link in their original email, in the end of survey message
from the pre-training survey, or in the reminder email. At the start of this survey, they were
randomly assigned to one of three conditions for the fear appeal: strong fear-appeal, weak fear
appeal, and control. The fear appeals were designed to manipulate employees’ perceptions of the
consequences of falling for phishing emails and are based on fear-appeals that have been
previously used in phishing email training (adapted from Jansen, 2018)(see Appendix H). At the
end of the fear appeal message, the respondent answered two message involvement items
designed to evaluate how impactful the fear appeal message was to the respondent (see Appendix
I). After reading the fear-appeal/control and answering the corresponding items, employees
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completed the post-training assessment (contained a parallel phishing email simulation and the
training reactions questions). After the completion of the post-training survey, employees were
thanked for their participation and closed out of Qualtrics.
Measures
Training Evaluation Measures
Trainee Learning Outcomes: Phishing Susceptibility. Phishing susceptibility was
measured through responses to simulated phishing emails. Simulations were administered in both
the pre- and posttest assessments. In each of the parallel assessments, participants were prompted
with 30 different emails, 10 of which were phishing emails and 20 of which were legitimate
emails. For each email, participants were asked to indicate 1) how they would respond to the
email and 2) their confidence in their response. An example phishing email stimulus with the
behavioral response options and confidence rating is provided in Appendix B. Appendix C
includes all email stimuli used in each the pre- and post-training surveys. The majority of the
emails were adapted to fit the TxDOT scenario (see Appendix D) from email stimuli used in
Martin et al.’s (2018) study. The remaining emails were either created for the purposes of this
study or drafted from real phishing emails found online.
First, emails from the pre- and post-training simulations were matched on the proportion
of safe responses obtained in Martin et al.’s (2018) study. The stimuli were then pilot-tested on 8
mTurkers with the order of the emails randomized. The stimuli were split into the different
surveys (pre and post) to achieve essentially equivalent summary statistics for each survey (see
Table 2 below). The number and types of email design features for each email were coded by
two research assistants and discussed to consensus. The average number of phishing features per
email were also balanced for each assessment. The above design precautions were used to create
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email simulations with matching threat levels. The emails in each the pre- and post-training
surveys had about 35% of people respond safely on average based on the Martin et al. (2018)
data and an average of about 40% based on the pilot data.

Table 2. Email Stimuli Pilot Testing Statistics
Pre-Training Stimuli

Post-Training Stimuli
Proportion
Proportion
Stimulus
# of
Proportion
Safe
Stimulus
# of
Proportion
Safe
ID
features
Safe*
(Pilot)**
ID
features
Safe*
(Pilot)**
L19
0
0.09
0.38 L37
1
0.09
0.38
L10
0
0.09
0.63 L24
0
0.10
0.38
L6
0
0.13
0.75 L34
2
0.10
0.25
L14
0
0.15
0.13 L32
0
0.19
0.13
L15
0
0.16
0.13 L31
0
0.15
0.63
L3
2
0.16
0.38 L33
2
0.16
0.25
L18
0
0.19
0.13 L23
2
0.21
0.25
L16
0
0.21
0.25 L21
0
0.22
0.13
L5
0
0.22
0.13 L25
0
0.23
0.13
L12
0
0.23
0.13 L35
0
0.24
0.25
L17
1
0.24
0.38 L22
0
0.26
0.13
L2
0
0.25
0.75 L29
0
0.27
0.25
L11
0
0.27
0.25 L4
0
0.30
0.13
L26
0
0.31
0.25 L27
1
0.40
0.63
L8
0
0.39
0.75 L28
0
0.47
0.25
L13
0
0.47
0.50 L36
0
0.50
0.38
L9
1
0.48
0.25 L30
1
0.61
0.33
L1
1
0.53
0.88 L38
0
N/A
0.13
L7
0
0.58
0.75 L40
2
N/A
0.13
L20
6
N/A
0.63 L39
0
N/A
0.63
P7
3
0.26
0.13 P20
4
0.15
0.13
P5
4
0.35
0.88 P16
3
0.21
0.50
P2
5
0.37
0.50 P11
4
0.35
0.50
P3
5
0.45
0.88 P14
5
0.36
1.00
P8
6
0.52
0.13 P13
4
0.47
0.63
P1
8
0.66
0.38 P17
5
0.51
1.00
P6
6
0.70
0.63 P18
7
0.60
0.63
P9
6
0.86
0.63 P19
7
0.76
0.63
P10
3
N/A
0.25 P15
6
0.85
0.88
P4
3
N/A
0.38 P12
4
N/A
0.75
Average
2
0.35
0.44 Average
2
0.34
0.41
Min
0
0.09
0.13 Min
0
0.09
0.13
Max
8
0.86
0.88 Max
7
0.85
1.00
Notes. *based on data from Martin et al. (2018), N=207. **Based on pilot data from Mturk
respondents, N=8.
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SDT was used to evaluate the responses to the email stimuli and to calculate two metrics
to quantify phishing susceptibility; phishing detection ability and response bias. Both d-prime
and response bias were calculated based on Macmillan and Creelman’s (2004) equations.
Confidence ratings were collected in order to calculate and Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curve (Macmillan & Creelman, 2004), which allowed for the testing of the equal variance
SDT model assumption.
Trainee Reactions. Trainee reactions was measured during the post-training assessment
using items adapted from (Tan, Hall, & Boyce, 2003) trainee reactions scale and Kirkpatrick’s
(1996) comment sheet (see Appendix E). These items include measures of both affective and
utility trainee reactions. The 3-item utility reactions scale demonstrated very good reliability (a =
.94) and the two affective reactions items correlated .87 with one another.
Cognitive Ability
Items available through a public domain assessment tool for measuring different
dimensions of cognitive ability, the International Cognitive Ability Resource (ICAR) 16-item
test were used for measuring several cognitive ability dimensions (The International Cognitive
Ability Resource Team, 2014) (see Appendix F). The 16-item measure demonstrated good
reliability (a = .79) (Condon & Revelle, 2014).
Demographics
Demographic questions relating to gender, age, ethnicity, education, income, tenure, and
cyber-security/IT experience were measured at the end of the pre-training assessment. At the
beginning of the post-training assessment, participants were asked background questions about
the training related to the date they completed the training, the number of attempts they used, and

41

the number of times they have completed the training (see Appendix G for a list of all the
demographic and background questions).
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CHAPTER THREE: RESULTS
This section details the results for the present study. First, the suitability of using SDT
metrics for the observed data was evaluated using model fitting of generated ROC curves to the
observed data. Then, the equal-variance assumption that the noise and signal distributions have
equivalent variance was evaluated using chi-square difference tests comparing the freely
estimated ROC curve models with those with constrained variances. Next, SDT statistics were
computed and the hypotheses were tested.
SDT Analyses
Model Fitting
ROC curves for the pre-training and post-training phishing susceptibility were plotted to
evaluate the fit of the SDT model to the observed data. The confidence ratings data was used to
add additional criteria and construct the empirical ROC curves (Macmillan & Creelman, 2004).
For each participant, the average confidence across all stimuli was computed. Any responses
where the participant’s confidence rating was above or equal to their average confidence were
coded as “sure”, while any responses with confidence ratings less than their average confidence
were coded as “unsure”. For example, if a participant’s average confidence rating across all 30
pre-training stimuli was 65% and for one of the phishing email stimuli they endorsed the safe
response with a 50% confidence, this response was coded as an “unsure” safe behavior response
to a phishing email stimulus.
The coordinates for the ROC curves were computed by first creating a frequency
stimulus-response table, which totals the number of responses for each stimulus-response pair
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(see Table 3). Next, the proportion of trials on which the stimulus yielded each response is
calculated by dividing each cell from the stimulus-response table by the total number of
responses for that stimulus type (see Table 4). These values are then cumulated to be used as the
ROC coordinates (see Table 5 and Figure 6).

Table 3. Frequency Stimulus-Response Table
Response
Safe Behavior
Unsafe Behavior
"Sure"
"Unsure"
"Unsure"
"Sure"
Total
Legitimate Email
642
379
453
826
2300
Pre-training
Phishing Email
660
252
92
146
1150
Legitimate Email
576
304
361
1059
2300
Post-training
Phishing Email
789
222
47
92
1150
Note. N = 115. Participants made a binary detection response indicating “Option 1” for safe behaviors and
“Option 2” for unsafe behaviors. This response was immediately followed by a confidence judgment. The
participants’ confidence judgments were coded into sure and unsure based on whether it fell above or below the
participants’ mean confidence rating. Participants with less than 30 responses for the confidence questions were
excluded. The values in each cell represent the number of responses for the stimulus-response pair.

Table 4. Proportion Stimulus-Response Table
Safe Behavior
Unsafe Behavior
Total
"Sure"
"Unsure"
"Unsure"
"Sure"
Legitimate Email
.28
.16
.20
.36
1.00
Pre-training
Phishing Email
.57
.22
.08
.13
1.00
Legitimate Email
.25
.13
.16
.46
1.00
Post-training
Phishing Email
.69
.19
.04
.08
1.00
Note. N = 115. The values in each cell represent the proportion of responses for the stimulus-response pair.
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Table 5. Hit and False-Alarm Rates: Cumulative Proportions
Safe Behavior
Unsafe Behavior
"Sure"
"Unsure"
"Unsure"
"Sure"
Legitimate Email
.28
.44
.64
1.00
Pre-training
Phishing Email
.57
.79
.87
1.00
Legitimate Email
.25
.38
.54
1.00
Post-training
Phishing Email
.69
.88
.92
1.00
Note. N = 115. The values in each cell represent the cumulative frequencies of responses for the stimulusresponse pair.

After plotting the points for the observed data on an ROC curve (see Figure 6),
Maximum-likelihood was used to generate SDT parameters (Dorfman & Alf, 1969). As is
customary in the SDT literature, the mean and standard deviation of the noise distribution were
set to 0 and 1, respectively (Macmillan & Creelman, 2004). The generated points according to
the best-fitting parameters are plotted with X’s in Figure 6. Close correspondence of these points
to the observed data indicated that the SDT model fit the data well.
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Figure 6. Model 1: Relaxed Model with the Variances Freely Estimated

SDT states that 7′ is unaffected by response bias only if the assumption that the noise and
signal distributions have equal variance is met (Macmillan & Creelman, 2004; Stanislaw &
Todorov, 1999). When the equal-variance assumption is not met, 7′ varies with response bias
and alternative measures (i.e., da) must be used. This unequal-variance is observable through an
asymmetrical ROC curve, whereas equal-variance SDT models have symmetrical implied ROC
curves. To evaluate the equal-variance assumption that is required for the calculation of 7′ and c,
the freely-estimated model (Figure 6) was compared to an equal-variance model where the
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standard deviation of the signal distribution was constrained to be equal to the standard deviation
of the noise distribution. The chi-square difference tests of model fit to evaluate the EVSDT
assumption did not show a significant difference between the relaxed model where the variance
was freely estimated and the constrained model (see Figure 7) where the variance was fixed to be
the same as the noise distribution for either the pre-training assessment (χ2 = .64, p = .42) or the
post-training assessment (χ2 = 1.76, p = .18) (see Table 6), indicating the equal-variance
assumption was met for both assessments.

Figure 7. Model 2: Equal Variance SDT Predicted Model with the Variances Constrained
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Table 6. Chi-Square Difference Tests of Model Fit: Equal-Variance

Pre
Post

Model
μ
Model 1: Relaxed
.77
Model 2: Constrained
.83
Equal Variance
Model 1: Relaxed
1.03
Model 2: Constrained
1.26
Equal Variance
Model Comparison Pre (1&2): Δ χ2
Model Comparison Post (1&2): Δ χ2

σ
.88

c1
.59

c2
.12

c3
-.35

χ2
2.13

df
3

p
.35

1.00

.59

.12

-.36

2.77

4

.25

.69

.68

.29

-.09

1.77

3

.41

1.00

.69

.28

-.10

4.53

4

.10

.64
1.76

1
1

.42
.18

Notes. μ = mean of the signal distribution, σ = standard deviation of the signal distribution, c1-3 =
confidence criterion
In order to further evaluate the equal-variance assumption, the ROCs were transformed
into zROCs (see Figure 8). A zROC with a non-unit slope (or a slope not equal to one) indicates
that the equal-variance assumption is not met and computation of an alternative measure of 7 8 ,
71 is required. 71 is a measure of sensitivity that assumes unequal variance underlying
distributions (Simpson & Fitter, 1973; Macmillan & Creelman, 2002). Notably, 71 is equivalent
to 7 8 when the ROC slope is 1, so if the underlying distribution for the pre-training assessment is
equal variance, 71 will be of the same value as 7 8 .
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Figure 8. zROC of SDT Predicted Model

From the zROC, it is evident that the post-training line is not a perfectly unit slope,
suggesting unequal-variance of the noise and signal distributions in the post-training simulation.
Closer examination of the data revealed that there were 48 respondents without any misses
(responding unsafely to phishing emails) in the post-training simulation. This means that almost
42% of the respondents had 10 hits in the safe response to the phishing email stimuli cells of the
stimulus-response matrix (between the “sure” and “unsure” confidence levels). This contributes
to the asymmetry of the ROC curve because for the second and third ROC points, these
participants had a hit rate of 1.00, which would draw those points toward the top of the ROC
plot, as is evidenced in Figure 6. To evaluate whether this was the main contributing factor to the
49

asymmetry of the ROC plot, ROC curves were generated with the 48 identified respondents
removed (see Figure 9). A zROC was also generated for this sample (see Figure 10). These plots
reflect an equal-variance underlying distribution, as evidenced by the symmetry (in Figure 9) and
unit slope (in Figure 10).

Figure 9. Adjusted Model with Post-Training Responses with No Misses Removed
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Figure 10. Adjusted zROC with Post-Training Responses with No Misses Removed

From this, it can be inferred that the equal-variance assumption would hold for all the
data if there had been a greater number of signals (phishing emails) to reduce the chances that so
many participants would have 100% hit rate. This combined with the evidence from the chisquared difference test of model fit that the fit was not significantly worse for the equal-variance
model than the freely-estimated model (Table 6) justify the use of equal-variance SDT metrics
(7 8 , =) to test the study hypotheses.
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Calculation of SDT Metrics
Two equal-variance SDT statistics were used to test the hypotheses regarding phishing
email detection ability (d′) and response bias (c). A pre- and post-training sensitivity (7′), or
phishing email detection ability, was computed for each participant through the following
calculation: 1) computed the number of hits, misses, false alarms, and correct rejections based on
the stimulus-response pairings (30 in each simulation); 2) computed the hit and false alarm rates
(see Table 7 for the averaged hit and false alarm rates); 3) computed 7′ by taking the difference
between the inverse normal cumulative distribution functions (cdf) of the hit and false alarm
rates.

Table 7. Stimulus-Response Matrix
Stimulus

Response to prompt (“How would you handle this email?”)
Pre-Training
Post-Training
Safe Behavior
Unsafe Behavior
Safe Behavior
Unsafe Behavior
S1 = Legitimate email
False alarms
Correct rejections
False alarms
Correct rejections
(44.4)
(55.6)
(38.0)
(62.0)
S2 = Phishing email
Hits
Misses
Hits
Misses
(78.0)
(22.0)
(86.0)
(14.0)
Note. N=115. Values are in percentages and reflect the aggregate of responses across participants.

There were respondents who detected every signal (responded cautiously/safely to all 10
phishing emails), detected no signals (responded normally/unsafely to all 10 phishing emails),
had zero false alarms (respond normally/unsafely to all 20 legitimate emails), or had a 100%
false alarm rate (responded safely to all 20 legitimate emails). Hit and false alarm rates of either
0 or 1 pose a problem for computing 7′ because a probability value of 1 corresponds to an
inverse normal cdf value of negative infinity while a probability value of 0 corresponds to an
inverse normal cdf value of positive infinity. The conventional adjustment for this issue in SDT
is to set the minimum probability to one divided by two times the number of trials used (1/2N).
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For instance, the minimum value for the false alarm rate in this study with the adjustment is
1/(2*20) or .025. Similarly, the adjustment for the maximum probability value is one minus one
divided by two times the number of trials used (i.e., for the hit rate in this study: 1-1/(2*10) =
.95). This adjustment was applied when the number of misses or the number of false alarms was
zero so that 7′ could still be calculated. This process, including the adjustment is reproduced for
two example participants in Table 8.

Table 8. Formulas for Calculation of SDT Statistics for Example Participants
Formula (for Column B; Then copy to all
A (Labels Only)
other columns)
B (Part. 1)
C (Part. 2)
7
10
1
# hits
3
0
2
# misses
10
9
3
# false alarms
4
10
11
# correct rejections
0.7
0.90
5
HR (hit rate)
=IF(B2>0, B1 / 10, .95)
0.5
0.45
6
FAR (false alarm rate)
=IF(B3>0, B3 / 20, .025)
0.524
1.645
7
z(HR)
=NORMSINV(B5)
0.000
-0.126
8
z(FAR)
=NORMSINV(B6)
9
0.524
1.407
d′
=B7-B8
-0.262
-0.760
10 c
= -.5*SUM(B7:B8)
Note. This process was completed twice for each participant to compute the pre- and post-training d′ values. A
higher value indicates higher sensitivity, or a greater ability to distinguish between phishing and legitimate
emails.

Table 9 provides a summary of the SDT statistics used in this study, including the
calculation, typical range, and interpretation within the context of this study.
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Table 9. Summary of SDT Metrics
SDT
Metric
Hit Rate

Formula

Typical
Min.
0

Typical
Max.
1

Interpretation
Values closer to 1 indicate a higher
proportion of phishing emails were
treated as if they were threatening
# EF FPQJN PQPROJ
False
0
1
Values closer to 1 indicate a higher
56" =
# EF QNMHIHOPIN NOPHQJ KRNJNLIN7
Alarm
proportion of legitimate emails were
Rate
treated as if they were threatening
D-prime
0*
3
Values closer to 3 indicate a greater
78 = 9(!") − 9(56")
ability to detect phishing emails
Response
-3
3
Positive values indicate a tendency
= = .5[9(!") + 9(56")]
Bias
to treat emails as if they are
legitimate. Negative values indicate
a tendency to treat emails as if they
are threatening.
Note. *Negative 7′ values can occur through response confusion (e.g., responding “Option 1” when intending to
respond “Option 2”)(Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999).
# EF ℎHIJ
!" =
# EF KℎHJℎHLM NOPHQJ KRNJNLIN7

Hypothesis Testing
SPSS 24 was used to compute the SDT statistics, 7′ and c, and to test the study
hypotheses. Before proceeding with the analyses, the focal study variables were evaluated for
normality and outliers. There were no concerns with any of the data. Descriptive statistics were
computed for the focal study variables (see Table 10). Then, correlational analyses were
computed for all study variables (see Table 11). Through initial examination of the correlation
analyses, it is evident that the study variables are related in the expected directions. Both utility
reactions (M = 4.01, SD = .96) and affective reactions (M = 3.82, SD = .94) were positively and
significantly related to training effectiveness (M = .46, SD = .69), as measured by the difference
in 7′ between the pre- and post-training assessments; r(115) = .28, p < .01 and r(114) = .23, p <
.05. Cognitive ability (M = .51, SD = .27) and training effectiveness, measured by the difference
in 7′ did not have a significant negative correlation; r(115) = .04, p = .69. However, cognitive
ability was significantly related to both pre-training (M = 1.04, SD = .61) and post-training
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phishing email detection ability (M = 1.51, SD = .72); r(120) = .18, p < .05 and r(121) = .20, p <
.05.

Table 10. Descriptive Statistics for Focal Study Variables
HR (pre-training)
HR (post-training)
7′ (pre-training)
7′ (post-training)
c (pre-training)
c (post-training)
7′ (difference)
c (difference)
Cognitive Ability
Reaction: Utility
Reaction: Affective

N
120
121
120
121
120
121
115
115
126
126
125

M
0.78
0.86
1.04
1.51
-0.37
-0.44
0.46
-0.08
0.51
4.01
3.82

SD Skewness Kurtosis
0.16
-1.24
2.26
0.12
-1.40
1.15
0.61
0.14
0.24
0.72
-0.84
0.72
0.57
0.07
1.48
0.50
-0.52
0.89
0.69
-0.34
0.35
0.48
0.06
4.46
0.27
-0.15
-0.94
0.96
-1.37
1.92
0.94
-1.07
1.36
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Table 11. Correlations among Study Variables
1
!′ (difference)
c (difference)
-.09
-.39**
!′ (pre-training)
c (pre-training)
.24**
.62**
!′ (post-training)
c (post-training)
.18
Reaction: Utility
.28**
Reaction: Affective
.23*
Cognitive Ability
.04
Income
-.15
Tenure (position)
-.06
Tenure (TxDOT)
-.08
Gender
-.03
Education
.26**
Age
.09
Cyber Education
-.16
Computer Fix
-.01
# of emails per day
.13
Time spent on emails
-.07
# of completed trainings
-.08
# of attempts to pass final
-.10
training quiz
Notes. N = 112-126. *p<.05, **p<.01
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

.01
-.59**
-.08
.33**
-.12
-.08
.00
-.01
.01
.04
-.09
.08
.04
-.06
.03
.12
.16
.07
.07

.16
.48**
.24*
-.04
-.14
.18*
-.10
.05
.05
-.08
-.06
-.04
.12
.19*
-.01
.11
.07
.02

.40**
.60**
.08
.05
.04
-.19*
-.04
-.15
-.14
.19*
-.19*
.10
.00
.00
.00
-.08
.07

.38**
.18*
.06
.20*
-.26**
-.05
-.07
-.14
.22*
-.03
-.04
.20*
.10
.01
-.05
-.06

-.02
-.05
.06
-.19*
-.02
-.12
-.23*
.27**
-.19*
-.04
.01
.10
.12
.01
.11

.88**
.02
-.03
-.04
-.06
-.13
.07
-.02
.01
-.09
.07
.01
-.07
.05

.00
.05
-.06
.00
-.11
.05
-.07
-.01
-.12
.10
.04
-.06
.04

-.05
-.08
.11
.12
.15
-.15
.02
.28**
.00
.06
.14
-.15

-.09
-.09
.15
-.17
.14
-.03
-.14
.03
.01
-.02
.01
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Table 11, continued. Correlations among Study Variables.
11
Tenure (position)
Tenure (TxDOT)
.63**
Gender
.19*
Education
-.05
Age
.26**
Cyber Education
-.04
Computer Fix
-.16
# of emails per day
.13
Time spent on emails
.06
# of completed trainings
.53**
# of attempts to pass final
-.12
training quiz
Notes. N = 81-179. *p<.05, **p<.01
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

.30**
-.01
.36**
-.08
.00
.13
.11
.62**
-.09

-.04
.18
.01
.14
-.01
-.02
.15
.03

.05
-.12
.09
.28**
.29**
-.07
-.08

-.08
-.09
.18*
.10
.30**
-.24**

.03
.01
-.02
-.14
.11

.18*
.17
-.02
-.04

.43**
.09
-.07

.11
.08

-.09
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Research question 1 and hypotheses 1 and 3 concerned the effect of training on phishing
detection ability (!′) and response bias (c). These hypotheses were assessed with two pairedsample t-tests comparing pre-test and post-test scores. The mean pre-training response bias was .37 (SD = .50) and the mean post-test response bias was -.45 (SD = .56). A paired-samples t-test
showed that the post-test response bias was not significantly different than the pre-test response
bias at t(114) = -1.68, p = .10 (see also Table 12). Thus, hypothesis 1 was not supported. The
mean pre-test sensitivity (!′) was 1.05 (SD = .62) and the mean post-test sensitivity was 1.51 (SD
= .72). A paired-samples t-test showed that the post-test detection ability was significantly higher
than the pre-test detection ability at t(114) = 7.19, p <.001, Cohen’s d = .67 (see also Table 12),
supporting hypothesis 3.

Table 12. Training Effectiveness T-tests

Sensitivity
(!′)
Response
bias (c)

Pre-test
Post-test
Between posttest-pretest
Pre-test
Post-test
Between posttest-pretest

N
115
115
115
115
115
115

M
1.05
1.51
.46
-.37
-.45
-.08

SD
.62
.72
.69
.56
.50
.48

SEM
.06
.07
.06
.05
.05
.04

t

df

p-value

7.19

114

<.001

-1.68

114

.095

The influence of fear appeals on the two different outcomes (hypotheses 2 & 4) was
tested with two one-way ANOVAs. A one-way ANOVA revealed no significant difference in
response bias between the control group (M = -.04, SD = .60, N=38), weak fear appeal group (M
= -.06, SD = .45, N=36), and strong fear appeal group (M = -.12, SD = .38, N=41), F(2, 114) =
.27, p = .77. Thus, hypothesis 2 was not supported. The one-way ANOVA for phishing email
detection ability also revealed no significant difference between the control group (M = .41, SD =
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.71), weak fear appeal group (M = .60, SD = .54), and strong fear appeal group (M = .38, SD =
.77), F(2, 114) = 1.16, p = .32, supporting hypothesis 4.
Regression analyses were used to test the remaining hypotheses concerning the influence
of cognitive ability and trainee reactions on phishing detection ability and training effectiveness
(Research Question 2 and Hypothesis 5-7b). Cognitive ability scores (M = .51, SD = .27)
significantly predicted pre-training phishing detection ability; t(118) = 2.03, p < .05 (see Table
13 for the regression model and Figure 11 for a scatterplot of the relationship). In answer to
research question 1, regarding the influence of cognitive ability on the effectiveness of training,
there was no significant effect of cognitive ability on training effectiveness (Δ!′); t(114) = .41, p
= .57.

Table 13. Regression Model for Cognitive Ability Predicting Pre-Training Phishing Detection
Predictor
B
Constant
.83*
Cognitive Ability
.42*
Note. N=119. *p < .05. B=standardized beta

SE(B)
.12
.21
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B

95% CI

.18*

0.10, 0.82
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Figure 11. Scatterplot of Pre-Training Phishing Detection Ability and Cognitive Ability Scores

A linear regression revealed that utility reactions significantly predicted training
effectiveness (Δ!′), t(114) = 3.15, p < .01 (see Table 14 and Figure 12). Another regression
analysis showed that affective reactions also significantly predicted training effectiveness (Δ!′),
t(112) = 2.52, p < .05 (see Table 15 and Figure 13). Thus, hypotheses 6a and 7a were supported.
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Table 14. Regression Model for Utility Reactions Predicting Training Effectiveness (Δ!′)
Predictor
B
Constant
-.35
Utility Reactions
.20*
Note. N=102. *p < .05. B=standardized beta

SE(B)
.27
.06

B

95% CI

.28*

0.08, 0.33

Table 15. Regression Model for Affective Reactions Predicting Training Effectiveness (Δ!′)
Predictor
B
Constant
-.18
Affective Reactions
.17*
Note. N=102. *p < .05. B=standardized beta

SE(B)
.26
.07

B

95% CI

.23*

0.10, 0.38
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Figure 12. Scatterplot of Utility Reactions and Training Effectiveness (Δ!′)

61

5.0

2.0

1.5

Dprime Diﬀ

1.0

0.5

0.0

-0.5

-1.0

-1.5

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

5.0

Aﬀective Scale

Figure 13. Scatterplot of Affective Reactions and Training Effectiveness (Δ!′)
Linear regressions revealed that neither utility nor affective reactions significantly
predicted the difference in response bias (M = -.08, SD = .48) between the pre-training and posttraining assessments; t(113) = -1.25, p = .21 and t(112) = -.83, p = .41, respectively. Thus,
hypotheses 6b and 7b were not supported.
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CHAPTER FOUR: DISCUSSION
The purpose of this study was to investigate the influence of cyber-awareness training
and fear appeals on phishing susceptibility, as measured by SDT metrics. Overall, the training
intervention did not result in a significant difference between pre- and post-training response
bias, as measured by c (hypothesis 1). However, training did result in a significant difference
between pre-training detection ability and post-training detection ability, as measured by !′
(hypothesis 3). The fear appeal conditions were not significantly different for response bias or
phishing email detection ability (hypotheses 2 and 4). As predicted, both utility and affective
reactions to training predicted training success in terms of the change in phishing email detection
ability (hypotheses 6a and 7a). However, neither utility nor affective reactions predicted change
in response bias between pre- and post-training assessments. Next, these specific results are
reviewed in greater detail. Then, the theoretical and practical implications, limitations, future
directions, and conclusions are discussed.
Hypothesis 1 was not supported since there was no significant difference in response bias
between pre- and post-training assessment. However, the observed difference was in the
hypothesized direction (a greater tendency to respond as if the stimulus was threatening) and was
approaching significance (p < .10). Thus, it is possible that this effect would be detected with
greater power. Still, the average difference between groups was small (-.08), which may not
indicate a meaningful shift in response bias. It could be that the training intervention did not
change individual’s payoff perceptions in terms of their perceived costs associated with misses
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and false alarms since the training primarily concerned recognizing characteristics of phishing
emails.
Perhaps the artificial nature of the email simulations precluded a change in response bias
because the perceived costs to false alarms were lower within this simulated email detection task
than they would be in reality. It would be interesting to evaluate whether there is a change in
response bias for actual, on-the-job behavior regarding evaluating emails. It is worth noting that
participants averaged a negative response bias (cpre = -0.37 and cpost = -0.44), indicating a
tendency to respond as if an email is threatening. One explanation for this liberal response bias
could be a perceived low cost for false alarms. Specifically, in the email simulation, there is
virtually no cost to participants responding safely to emails, as opposed to in reality where there
could be a time and productivity cost for responding safely (e.g., forwarding the email to IT,
deleting the email) to legitimate emails.
Hypothesis 2, which predicted that change in response bias would differ between fear
appeal conditions, was not supported. The conditions did not significantly differ on response
bias. It is possible that the fear appeal intervention was not a salient enough intervention to
manipulate response bias. The fear appeals were at the start of the post-training assessment and
participants did not spend very much time reading the appeals, with an average of 105 seconds
(SD = 150) on the strong fear appeal and an average of 68 seconds (SD = 35) on the weak fear
appeal. Still, only a minority of respondents (N=3) did not favorably rate the message
involvement items after the fear appeals, indicating that most participants reported they read the
text carefully and perceived the text as having relevant information.
Jansen (2018) found significant differences between fear appeal conditions (using the
same fear appeals used in this study) for protection motivation and intentions to perform online
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cautionary behavior, but the effect sizes were very small. It could be that the small effect the fear
appeals have on individual’s behavioral intentions is diminished when it comes to actual
response behavior as measured in this study. Other recent studies that evaluated the influence of
fear appeals on cyber awareness training effectiveness also found small effects, even when using
different fear manipulations, such as new articles (Zielinska et al., 2014) or a generated
individual risk level (Davinson & Sillence, 2010).
Hypothesis 3, which predicted that training would significantly increase phishing email
detection ability was supported. This demonstrates that an informational approach to training that
provides details on email characteristics related to phishing emails is effective for improving
individual’s phishing email detection ability. This finding is consistent with other studies that
have found rule-based training is effective for reducing phishing email susceptibility (e.g.,
Alnajim & Munro, 2008, 2009; Kumaraguru et al., 2009, 2007, 2010; Mayhorn & Nyeste, 2012;
Sheng et al., 2007).
As hypothesized, the three different fear appeal conditions (strong, weak, and control) did
not significantly differ on phishing email detection ability (hypothesis 4). In contrast to the
informational approach to training, the fear-based approach was not found to have an effect. As
detailed above with regard to the lack of effect of fear appeals on response bias, this null result
could also be due to the lack of strength of the fear appeal intervention. It could also reflect the
SDT paradigm that stipulates that sensitivity is resistant to the influence of expectancy factors,
such as payoff perceptions. That is, sensitivity is separate from response bias, such that payoff
perceptions do not influence a person’s ability to distinguish between signal and noise. In the
context of phishing email detection, it makes sense that manipulating the perceptions of the costs
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of different outcomes (e.g., the cost of a false alarm for a legitimate email) would not influence
one’s ability to differentiate between a legitimate email and a phishing email.
Hypothesis 5, regarding the influence of cognitive ability on phishing email detection
ability was supported. This finding is consistent with previous research that found working
memory and selective attention were related to phishing susceptibility (Mayhorn & Nyeste,
2012). It also supports the notion that phishing email detection ability or sensitivity is a
perceptual ability that is influenced by stable individual characteristics, such as cognitive ability.
Hypotheses 6 and 7 were partially supported. Affective and utility reactions both
significantly predicted training success in terms of a change in sensitivity (hypotheses 6a and
7a), however they did not predict a change in response bias (hypotheses 6b and 7b). As discussed
above, the lack of change in response bias could be an artifact of the simulated environment
resulting in skewed payoff perceptions. Alternatively, it could be that training reactions
differentially impact phishing email detection ability and response bias.
Favorable affective and utility reactions provide an indication that employees were
motivated to learn during the training. For instance, employees who response favorably to liking
the training and finding it useful likely were more motivated to internalize the training and use it
on-the-job. Since the training was primarily informational in nature and emphasized learning the
distinguishing features of phishing emails, a heightened motivation to internalize training would
more likely influence phishing email detection ability rather than response bias.
Generally, the finding that affective and utility reactions influenced training success is
consistent with previous research across training domains (Blume et al., 2010). Particularly,
consistent with the present research, previous research has found that utility reactions have a
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stronger effect on training success than affective reactions (Alliger et al., 1997). These results
underscore the importance of communicating the utility of training to employees.
Implications
Practically speaking, the finding that training is effective for phishing email detection
ability is helpful to organizations, not only because it supports previous research demonstrating
the effectiveness of informational training in this domain, but also because the methods used in
this study to evaluate training could be adopted by organizations. As previously stated, only 54%
of information security professional surveyed in the State of the Phish Report reported being able
to quantify phishing susceptibility based on their training activities (Wombat Security
Technologies, 2018).
This study has several implications for practice regarding training evaluation. In terms of
Kirkpatrick’s four levels, organizations should consider including each of the levels: reactions,
learning, behavior and results. When evaluating training interventions for phishing email
susceptibility, organizations should include affective and utility reactions since they predict
training effectiveness. Training reactions are an important metric to gauge trainee’s impressions
of the training as well as their motivation for learning during the training. Learning is often
assessed with pre- and post-training assessments that evaluate the change in the knowledge,
skills, and/or attitudes that were a focus of the training. Learning could be assessed with an email
simulation, such as the one used in the present study. Behavior and results are more difficult to
measure in this context. Behavior could be assessed through periodic phishing of employees,
though as previously discussed there are ethical considerations with this method. Results could
be assessed through tracking both the number of breaches due to employees falling for phishing
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emails as well as reported instances where employees fell for a phishing email, but it did not
result in a breach due to IT intervention.
Since both prior research and findings from this study found fear appeals have little or no
effect on employee intentions and behavior with regard to phishing emails, organizations should
consider the usefulness of the fear approach to reducing phishing susceptibility before
implementation. Organizations should turn instead to different approaches with research
supporting the effectiveness, such as informational approaches. This consideration is also
important given the distinction between the influence of training on phishing email detection
ability and response bias. According to the present research, informational training impacts
sensitivity, but not response bias. This is an important finding for organizations because it
demonstrates that informational training does actually improve individuals’ ability to recognize
phishing emails rather than unilaterally changing their tendency to respond safely to emails.
There are implications for selection based on the result demonstrating that there is a
relationship between cognitive ability and phishing susceptibility. Cognitive ability is a known,
consistent predictor of job performance and is often used as part of selection assessment
batteries. Organizations may want to consider the extension of this trend to the narrow piece of
job performance assessed in this study, phishing email detection performance. It could also be
worth investigating whether there are more specific abilities that are strong predictors of
phishing email detection performance. With such a narrow performance space, it could make
sense to investigate more narrow cognitive ability predictors, such as selective attention. Further,
this information could be used to select individuals to target with phishing email training.
Interestingly, whether or not participants had experience helping someone fix a computer was
also related to phishing email detection performance on both the pre- and post-training
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assessment. Perhaps this background information could also be used to identify those who need
training.
Limitations and Future Directions
One major limitation of this study is the pretest-posttest no control design to test for
improvement of sensitivity attributable to training. The strongest case for causality, in terms of
the phishing email training resulting in improved phishing email detection, would be made with
a true experimental design with a control group that did not receive training, random assignment
to groups, and pre- and post-testing. However, for this field study, organizational constraints
prevented a true experimental design from being feasible. At TxDOT, all employees are required
to complete the phishing email training within 90 days of employment and then annually after
that date. TxDOT also cannot allow new employees to all be used as the control group because
they have too many onboarding tasks to be burdened with the survey. Moreover, there would
likely be significant selection bias introduced if only new employees were in the control group
compared with higher tenured employees in the training groups.
Still, quasi-experimental designs are commonly used in organizational setting because of
similar constraints (Condon & Revelle, 2014). Sackett and Mullen (1993) argued in their article
on design alternatives to the formal experimental design that a pretest-posttest no control design
paired with careful investigation into the plausibility of various threats to internal validity does
still permit the computation of a measure of change. One potential threat is that the phishing
simulation before the training introduced testing effects that resulted in the increased
performance on the post-training assessment. The use of parallel forms for the phishing email
simulation likely reduced the influence practice effects to some extent, however without a
control group, there is no way to directly test for these practice effects.
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Another threat to the internal validity of the study is that the lack of a control group
increases risk that there are potential alternative explanations for the change in phishing
detection ability, other than the training itself. The risk of potential alternative explanations
outside of training was evaluated to the extent possible. The Director of Workforce Development
was asked whether there were any other alternative explanations (e.g., history threats due to
other experiences that occurred during training) for the observed change in phishing detection
ability after training and did not disclose any concerns. Moreover, the design of the current study
where employees took the self-paced training at different times on their own (spread out over the
course of two to three months), reduces the likelihood of history threats to internal validity.
Another limitation worth noting that the design constraints required for using SDT
metrics impose considerable tradeoffs with regard to participant reactions and participant fatigue.
Specifically, testing of the equal-variance assumption requires the inclusion of confidence
ratings. Including confidence ratings adds an extra item for each stimulus, which meant 30 extra
items for each the pre- and post-training assessments in this study. Another design constraint for
using SDT metrics is including a large number of stimuli with varied signal strength to ensure
that there are not too many participants who get a 100% hit rate (correctly identify all phishing
emails) or 0% false alarm rate (correctly identify all legitimate emails). In this study, 10 phishing
emails and 20 legitimate emails were included in each assessment. Although the stimuli were
carefully designed and pilot tested, there were still a large proportion of participants who
achieved a 100% hit rate, particularly in the post-training assessment.
This high proportion of participants with a perfect hit rate is in contrast to previous work
with these same phishing email stimuli where less than 10% of the participants (N=19) attained a
100% hit rate (Martin, 2017). This difference is likely due in part to the different samples. The
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present study used TxDOT employees who were encouraged by their organization to take the
email simulations, whereas the previous study used mTurk workers who likely had less vested
interest in performing well on the email simulation.
With 30 emails and 30 confidence ratings in each simulation, there was much negative
feedback from participants regarding the length of the simulations. This negative feedback was
evident in participant comments (e.g., in a comment regarding the post-training survey a
participant said, “By the time I got to it, I’d had enough. The first “survey” was grueling, the
training was long and dull. And now I have to answer ANOTHER 30 QUESTIONS and rate my
confidence on my answers again? It’s just too much.”). Further, it could be inferred that the high
attrition rate between pre- and post-training surveys (46%) is in part due to negative reactions to
the pre-training survey. Future researchers who use a simulation email inbox and SDT metrics
for evaluating phishing email susceptibility should consider ways to achieve a better balance
between the design constraints and participant reactions. Perhaps gamifying the email
simulations by providing a superior user interface and feedback would reduce participant fatigue
and negative reactions by keeping participants engaged in the task.
Another future direction for research would be investigating ways to manipulate response
bias in phishing email tasks. Response bias did not significantly differ across any of the
conditions assessed in this study. It would be interesting to investigate under which conditions
response bias does differ. Incentives (e.g., rewards for identifying and forwarding phishing
emails to IT) would likely be influential in changing response bias. Particularly, finding which
manipulations are successful for changing response bias would be important for organizations
that wish to achieve an optimal response criterion in order to maximize or minimize certain
outcomes. For instance, if a company wanted to minimize the chance of a “miss”, or employees
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falling for phishing emails, they would want a liberal criterion like those observed in this study
where employees are more cautious and vigilant in their responses.
Another way to manipulate response bias through attitudinal change could be through
applications of social psychology research. Exploring how the fear appeal message could be
changed to maximize persuasion through the use of the central route to persuasion (Petty &
Cacioppo, 1986). Using the central route to persuasion to provide critical information about the
dangers of phishing emails would hopefully result in attitudinal change through careful scrutiny
of the message. Other features of the message, such as the likeability, credibility, and emotional
appeals.
Another area for future research is evaluating the effectiveness of the training
intervention over time. This study did not have a time measure of the time between the training
was completed and the post-training survey was completed. It would be useful to evaluate how
much the effect of the training diminishes over time. Blume et al. (2010) found that the effects of
learning outcomes (post-training knowledge and post-training self-efficacy) decreased over time.
It is likely that most participants took the post-training survey soon after completing the training,
so the large observed effect of the training may only be so large because of the small time lag
between training and the post-training learning measure.
A substantial area for future research concerns the refinement of the performance space
for phishing email detection performance and the further evaluation of predictors for this area of
performance. Overall, research conducted over the last 10 years shows largely mixed results for
predicting phishing susceptibility. Though it stands to reason that conscientious individuals who
tend to be dutiful in terms of following procedures and have high attention to detail would be
less susceptible to phishing emails (Darwish, Zarka, & Aloul, 2012; Parrish, Bailey, & Courtney,
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2009), several studies have found a null effect of conscientiousness on phishing susceptibility
(Halevi et al., 2013; Lawson et al., 2017; Martin et al., 2018; Pattinson et al., 2011; Schrammel,
Köffel, & Tscheligi, 2009; Sudzina & Pavlicek, 2017). Still, there was one study that found that
high levels of conscientiousness predicted low levels of cyber-attack victimization based on a
self-reported behavioral intention measure (based on four social network and social engineering
attack scenarios) in a sample of 316 faculty and students at two universities in Saudi Arabia
(Albladi & George, 2017). However, in a small sample (N=40) of employees in India Halevi,
Memon, & Nov (2015) found that individuals high in conscientious were more likely to click on
a link in a simulated phishing email (r = .32, p < .05). Thus, the existing research suggests that
more research is needed to clarify the relationship between conscientiousness and phishing
susceptibility.
In addition to conscientiousness, some researchers hypothesized that high levels of
agreeableness would predict security risks in terms of individuals more susceptible to phishing
emails (Darwish et al., 2012). Agreeable individuals tend to be more trusting, which could lead
them to be more easily influenced my social engineering tactics used in phishing emails.
However, research shows mixed results for agreeableness with the majority of studies reporting
non-significant results (Halevi et al., 2013, 2015; Lawson et al., 2017; McBride et al., 2012;
Pattinson et al., 2011; Schrammel et al., 2009; Sudzina & Pavlicek, 2017) and only one study
demonstrating a small effect where individuals high in agreeableness were more susceptible to
cyber-attack victimization (Albladi & George, 2017).
One explanation for these mixed results is that the bandwidth-fidelity dilemma needs to
be taken into consideration in these relationships. Since the criterion of interest (phishing
susceptibility) is a small facet of job performance, construct correspondence would suggest that
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lower order traits (facets of personality traits) would better predict phishing susceptibility (Judge,
Rodell, Klinger, Simon, & Crawford, 2013). For instance, instead of predicting phishing
susceptibility with agreeableness and conscientiousness, one could examine facets of these
constructs, such as trust (a facet of agreeableness) and dutifulness (a facet of conscientiousness).
Conclusion
The present study had three primary goals. The first goal was to evaluate the
effectiveness of phishing email training with regard to informational approaches and fearappeals. Two email simulations were developed to assess phishing email susceptibility before
and after the training and fear appeal interventions. While the informational training was
effective at improving participants’ phishing email detection ability, the fear-appeals did not
influence the phishing email susceptibility outcomes. The second goal was to distinguish
between sensitivity and response bias in phishing susceptibility and evaluate the differential
impact that training has on each of the two outcomes. The informational approach to training
improved phishing email detection ability but did not significantly change response bias. The
third goal was to understand the influence of the larger training context on training success. To
this aim, employees answered questions pertaining to training reactions, cognitive ability, and
demographics, which were evaluated for their effects on baseline phishing susceptibility (pretest
scores) and training success (changes in phishing sensitivity and response bias between the
pretest and posttest). Training reactions were found to predict training success, while cognitive
ability predicted baseline phishing susceptibility. By using psychological models, such as SDT,
to evaluate phishing susceptibility in a training context, the present findings yield novel insights
into the increasingly important role all employees play in an organization’s cyber-security.
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Appendix A: Recruitment Email
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Appendix B: Phishing Susceptibility Measure
Email Simulation Example:

Participants were prompted with 30 emails, presented one email at a time (see example above).
There were two questions to answer with each email.
Question 1 asked how they would handle the email and gives two response options (Option A
and Option B). Option A details actions someone may take to immediately address the sender's
email (reply to the sender by email, click on the link in the email, forward the email to a
coworker) while Option B details actions someone may take to get rid of or vet a suspicious
email (delete the email, forward to IT, contact the sender in person).
Question 2 asked respondents to indicate how confident they are that the action they chose is
appropriate for the email.
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Appendix C: Email Stimuli
Pre-Training Stimuli:
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L2
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Post-Training Stimuli:
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Appendix D: Scenario Prompt
Please read the following scenario in order to familiarize yourself with your role for this study.
Imagine you’re a Business Services Coordinator named Jordan Smith working for
TxDOT. Your additional duties include helping out with shipping, as well as helping managers
find new hire candidates. You work closely with a colleague in HRD, Terry, and some external
companies to provide employee referrals. The HR manager, Casey Johnson, is looking for
someone with an accounting background. Please read through your email inbox and, based on
the given information, evaluate the top candidates for interviews.
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Appendix E: Trainee Reactions and Training-Related Questions
Training Reaction Measure (adapted from Tan et al., 2003).
Please rate your agreement with the following statements about the TxDOT cyber awareness
training.
Response Options: 1 = “Strongly Disagree”; 2 = “Moderately Disagree”; 3 = “Neither Agree
nor Disagree”; 4 = “Moderately Agree”; 5 = “Strongly Agree”
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

I liked the training. (affective)
I have an overall good feeling about how the training was carried out. (affective)
The training allowed me to develop specific skills that I can use on the job. (utility)
The training is very useful. (utility)
The training content is pertinent to my needs and interests as a TxDOT employee.
(utility)

Open-ended comments:
What did you like about the training?
What did you dislike about the training?
Please list any suggestions to improve the training experience:
Please add any additional comments below:
Training Background Questions:
On which date did you complete the Securing the Human training?
How many times have you completed the Securing the Human (EL8474) training (over the
course of your career since we started requiring this in 2016)?
ú0
ú1
ú2
ú3
ú 4 or more
How many attempts did you use to complete the final quiz (to achieve the required 80% score)
for the Securing the Human (EL8474) training?
ú1
ú2
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ú
ú
ú
ú
ú

3
4
5 or more
Prefer not to answer
I don’t know
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Appendix F: Cognitive Ability
International Cognitive Ability Resource (ICAR) 16-Item (Condon & Revelle, 2014)
Items omitted for test security purposes. Please visit http://icar-project.org/ for item details.

130

Appendix G: Demographics
Pre-Training Survey Demographics/Background Questions:
1. Please select your TxDOT job family.
ú Architecture
ú Civil Rights/Business Opportunity
ú Engineering/Engineering Support
ú Environmental
ú Executive/Administrative/Clerical/Legal
ú Finance/Accounting
ú General Services/Contracts/Purchasing
ú Human Resources
ú Information Technology
ú Laboratory/Materials
ú Maintenance/Skilled Craft/Ferry Operations
ú Occupational Safety
ú Planning/Aviation/Public Trans/Legislative
ú Right of Way
ú Transportation Investigator
ú Travel/Public Information
ú Other ______
2. Please select you TxDOT work location.
ú Metro District
ú Urban District
ú Rural District
ú Division employee in the Austin area
ú Division employee in a District
ú Other ______
3. How long have you been in your current position (in years)?
ú 1-2
ú 3-5
ú 6-10
ú 11-15
ú 16+
ú Prefer not to answer
4. How long have you been at TxDOT (in years)?
ú 1-2
ú 3-5
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ú
ú
ú
ú

6-10
11-15
16+
Prefer not to answer

5. Please indicate your current income level:
ú Less than $15,000
ú $15,001 to $25,000
ú $25,001 to $35,000
ú $35,001 to $45,000
ú $45,001 to $50,000
ú $50,001 to $60,000
ú $60,001 to $75,000
ú More than $75,000
ú Prefer not to answer
6. Gender:
ú Male
ú Female
ú Other ______
ú Prefer not to answer
7. Indicate the highest level of education that you have completed.
ú Less than a High School Diploma
ú High School Diploma (or GED)
ú Some College Courses
ú Trade/technical/vocational training
ú Associate’s degree (or other two-year degree)
ú Bachelor’s degree
ú Post-Graduate Degree (Master’s, MBA, law, MD, PhD, etc.)
ú Prefer not to answer
8. What is your age (in years)?
ú 16-29
ú 30-39
ú 49-49
ú 50-59
ú 60+
ú Prefer not to answer
Cyber-security Experience
9. Do you have any cyber-related certifications?
ú Yes
ú No
If yes, please list your cyber-related certifications ________
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10. Other than the cyber-security training from TxDOT, do you have any education in cybersecurity?
ú Yes
ú No
11. Have you held a job where the primary responsibilities involved cyber-security?
ú Yes
ú No
If yes, what was the job title? ______
12. Have you ever helped someone fix a computer problem?
ú Definitely yes
ú Probably yes
ú Might or might not
ú Probably not
ú Definitely not
If yes, what assistance did you provide? ________
13. Approximately how many emails do you receive to your work email during the average
work day?
ú Less than 50
ú 51-100
ú 101-150
ú 151-200
ú More than 200
14. Approximately how much time do you spend on emails (reading, replying, cleaning
inbox, etc.) during the average work day?
ú Less than 1 hour
ú 1-2 hours
ú 2-3 hours
ú 3-4 hours
ú 4-5 hours
ú 5-6 hours
ú 6-7 hours
ú More than 7 hours
Post-Training Survey Demographics/Background Questions:
1. On which date did you complete the Securing the Human Training?
2. How many times have you completed the Securing the Human (EL8474) training (over
the course of your career since we started requiring this in 2016)?
ú 0
ú 1
ú 2
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ú
ú

3
4 or more

3. How many attempts did you use to complete the final quiz (to achieve the required 80%
score) for the Securing the Human (EL8474) training?
ú 1
ú 2
ú 3
ú 4
ú 5 or more
ú Prefer not to answer
ú I don’t know
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Appendix H: Fear Appeals
Strong Fear Appeal Message (adapted from Jansen, 2018):
Phishing is increasingly prevalent and is a common form of online fraud. Recent scientific
research reveals that up to 45% of all people fall for phishing attacks. The chances of getting
phished – or already having experienced it – are therefore very high.
Phishing attacks are becoming more sophisticated and tend to appear increasingly more credible.
Where phishing e-mails could previously be recognized by spelling mistakes, they now look very
much like the original emails sent by the organization that criminals imitate, are written in proper
English and are more personalized. This means that it becomes more difficult to recognize
phishing attempts and, therefore, more probable to fall victim to it. When criminals acquire your
personal information, they can take over your identity with which they perform all kinds of
harmful practices, such as robbing your bank account and purchasing products on your behalf.
A phishing attack often starts with receiving a phishing email. A simple and effective way to
counter phishing is to be extra careful when handing over your personal information so that you
are not at risk of receiving phishing emails. A specific measure that you can take is that you do
not share this information online with others, for example, on social media (Facebook, LinkedIn,
etc.), on your personal website or when a website asks for it. Research has shown that by taking
this simple measure you can prevent a phishing attack. Of course, you may need to share such
information, for example, when making purchases on a trusted website. The fact remains that
you have to deal with your personal information carefully. When you do not behave with the
recommended caution, you run a very high risk of getting phished!
Weak Fear Appeal Message (adapted from Jansen, 2018):
Phishing is a type of online fraud in which people are scammed. Recent scientific research
reveals that at least 3% of all people fall for phishing attacks. Therefore, there is a possibility that
you will also get phished or that you already have experienced it.
Although the risk of becoming a victim of phishing is small according to research, this can have
adverse consequences. Criminal are developing new phishing methods to gain personal
information. When criminals acquire your personal information, they can take over your identity
with which they perform all kinds of harmful practices, such as robbing your bank account and
purchasing products on your behalf.
A phishing attack often starts with receiving a phishing email. A simple and effective way to
counter phishing is to be extra careful when handing over your personal information so that you
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are not at risk of receiving phishing emails. A specific measure that you can take is that you do
not share this information online with others, for example, on social media (Facebook, LinkedIn,
etc.), on your personal website or when a website asks for it. Research has shown that by taking
this simple measure you can prevent a phishing attack. Of course, you may need to share such
information, for example, when making purchases on a trusted website. The fact remains that
you have to deal with your personal information carefully. When you do not behave with the
recommended caution, you run a chance of getting phished.
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Appendix I: Message Involvement Items
Message Involvement Measure (Jansen, 2018; Shillair et al., 2015)
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements about the text above.
Response Options: 1 = “Strongly Disagree”; 2 = “Moderately Disagree”; 3 = “Neither Agree
nor Disagree”; 4 = “Moderately Agree”; 5 = “Strongly Agree”
1. I have read the text carefully.
2. The text contains relevant information for me.
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Appendix J: Organizational Commitment Letter
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Appendix K: IRB Approval Letter
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